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Work Product of the Rulesmakers
Edward H. Cooper*
Early in 1947, the United States Supreme Court in Hickman
v. Taylor bypassed a proposed amendment to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, in favor of a decisional resolution of the
apparent conflict between free-sweeping discovery and protection of the "work product" of adversary counsel. It coyly
suggested that "until some rule or statute definitely prescribes
otherwise," discovery could not be allowed as a matter of unqualified right.1 In 1955, a second proposal was advanced to
incorporate the work product doctrine in the text of the Rules,
albeit in backhand fashion. It too was rejected.2 The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules has now started the third
swing by including a work product provision in the discovery
rules, observing that there now seems to be sufficient decisional
experience to warrant adoption of a formal rule.3
Under the current proposal, the present requirement that
documents of any sort are subject to production only after a
judicial finding of good cause is to be removed from Rule 34.
In its place will be a general rule of discoverabiity without a
* Associate Professor, U. of Minn. Law School. The author
wishes to express deep appreciation to his colleague, Professor James L.
Hetland, Jr., who reviewed a draft of this article and made several
helpful suggestions.
1. 329 U.S. 495, 514 (1947). The history of the proposal transmitted to the Court in June, 1946, is set out in 4 J. MooRE, FEDERAL
Practice f 26.23[6], 30.10[4] (2d ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as MooRE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE]; Tolman, Discovery Under the Federal Rules: Pro-

duction of Documents and the Work Product of the Lawyer, 58 COLUm.
L. REV. 498, 504-07 (1958); Report of Proposed Amendments to Rules of

Civil Procedure, 5 F.R.D. 433, 456-60 (1946).
2. The 1955 proposal, as submitted to the Court, would have
amended Rule 34 by retaining the requirement that good cause be
shown to obtain production of documents by court order, but adding a
further provision for production without court order of documents "subject to discovery without a showing of necessity or justification."
This limitation was apparently intended to continue the work product
doctrine. See Tolman, supra note 1, at 509-13. Professor Moore dis-

sented vigorously from the proposed amendments, 4 MOORE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE I[ 26.23[8-5]. Other contemporary comment also scored the
proposal as sadly wanting. E.g., Groce, Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure,23 INs. CouNs. J. 7, 12 (1956).
3. COMIVTTEE ON RuLEs OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, PRELIVINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS To RuLEs OF Civn PRocEDuRE 21 (November, 1967)
[hereinafter cited as PRELIMINARY DRAFT].
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showing of cause or need for a court order, supplemented by the
following provision:
i. . a party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible
things prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or
for another party or by or for that other party's representative
(including his attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer,
or agent) only upon a showing of good cause therefor, except
that a statement concerning the action or its subject matter
previously given by the party seeking the statement may be
obtained without such a showing. A statement of a party is
(A) a written statement signed or otherwise adopted or approved by the party, or (B) a stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other recording, or a transcription thereof, which is
a substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement which
4
was made by the party and contemporaneously recorded.
Adoption of the proposed Rule may have a healthy effect
in the continuing restriction of the work product doctrine.
Current decisions in closely related areas of discovery have come
a long way toward limiting the doctrine to one or perhaps two
concepts of strategic and impeachment surprise; discerning application of the proposed Rule, along with other proposed amendments, should speed this process to its ultimate conclusion. At
the same time, the proposed Rule would clearly freeze into the
text of the Rules a broad scope of protection for witness statements.
In undertaking an evaluation of these effects of the proposed
codification of the work product doctrine, it will be necessary
first to examine the explanations which have been offered for it,
both at its inception and subsequently. Next these explanations
will be set against the body of emerging discovery practices
which are for the most part embodied in other proposed amendments to the discovery rules and which-unless abandonedempty these explanations of any significant meaning. Finally,
this background will serve as the basis for an examination of
4. PPnnvnARY DRAFT, Rule 26(b) (3). This rule is expressly
made subject to the provisions of Rule 26(b) (4), which provides for
discovery of the "facts known or opinions held by" expert witnesses to
be called at trial as a matter of course, and for similar discovery of
other experts retained in anticipation of litigation only in cases of undue
hardship or other exceptional circumstances. It is now generally recognized that the scope of discovery of information prepared by experts
in anticipation of trial should be limited, if at all, on the basis of
considerations quite different from those underlying the work product
doctrine. See United States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 1968), containing an exhaustive discussion of the relevant authorities and proposed
Rule 26(b) (4). See also Frank, Pretrial Conferences and Discovery
-Disclosure or Surprise?, 514 INs. L.J. 661, 669-71 (1965). Accordingly,
no separate treatment will be devoted here to discovery of expert
investigation and testimony.
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the reasons for abandoning the protection presently accorded
witness statements. It will be suggested in conclusion that
the proposed Rule be rejected, although it may be suitable to
include a general reference to "work product" in the Rule which
provides protection against undue discovery.

I. WORK PRODUCT OF HICKMAN v. TAYLOR

5

Proponents of special protection from discovery for materials gathered in preparation for trial could not have found a
more suitable vehicle for establishing their position than the
Hickman case. Four surviving crew members of a sunken
tug were examined at a public hearing before the United States
Steamboat Inspectors less than a month after the accident, and
their recorded testimony was made available to all interested
parties. Shortly thereafter statements were obtained from them
by counsel for the tug's owners. During the ensuing Jones Act
litigation brought by the administrator of one of the deceased
crewmen, the tug owners supplied answers to interrogatories
which, according to the Court, "would necessarily have included
all pertinent information" obtained by counsel from crew members and other witnesses. The plaintiff, however, also requested production of any written statements taken from members of the crews of the sunken tug, another named tug, and any
other vessel relating to the towing operation and sinking; it
was further requested that the "exact provisions" of any oral
statements be "set forth in detail." Discovery was sought to be
justified on the bald claim that it would be useful for plaintiff's attorney "to help prepare himself to examine witnesses and
to make sure that he has overlooked nothing."6
Mr. Justice Murphy, speaking for the Court, ruled that discovery in such circumstances would contravene "the public policy underlying the orderly prosecution and defense of legal
claims." Stressing the lawyer's role as an officer of the court,
5. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
6. Id. at 513. Appellate review was based on a judgment finding
counsel and clients guilty of contempt for refusing to obey an order to
produce written statements and to set out the contents of any oral statements. See 153 F.2d 212 (3d Cir. 1945) (reversing the order of contempt); 4 F.R.D. 479 (E.D. Pa. 1945) (ordering discovery). The order of
contempt has ordinarily been accepted as a criminal contempt. See 153
F.2d at 214; 4 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ff 26.23[5], at 1354. Judge
Brown, however, has urged that it involved civil contempt. Southern
Ry. v. Lanham, 403 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1968), 12 FED. RULES SERV. 2D 34.411,
Case 3 (Brown, Ch. J., dissenting from denial of en banc rehearing).
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needing privacy during his preparation of facts, legal theory, and
strategy in an adversary proceeding, he explained that,
[w]ere such materials open to opposing counsel on mere demand, much of what is now put down in writing would remain unwritten. An attorney's thoughts, heretofore inviolate,
would not be his own. Inefficiency, unfairness and sharp
practices would inevitably develop in the giving of legal advice and in the preparation of cases for trial. The effect on
the legal profession would be demoralizing. And the interests7
of the clients and the cause of justice would be poorly served.
No more explicit reasoning or explanation of the reach of the
work product doctrine was offered. Despite a certain ambiguity,8
it seems tolerably clear that the Court intended to allow discovery of all "factual" information whether obtained by counsel or otherwise, a concession to the demands of discovery
which goes a long way toward depriving the doctrine of any
great importance.9 Beyond this point, the opinion consists of a
vague amalgam of references to "injustice" and "hardship," along
with the following suggestion of the circumstances which might
justify discovery of work product materials:
... written statements and documents might, under certain
circumstances, be admissible in evidence or give clues as to
the existence or location of relevant facts, or they might be
useful for purposes of impeachment or corroboration. And
production might be justified where the witnesses are no
longer available or can be reached only with difficulty. Were
production of written statements and documents to be precluded under such circumstances, the liberal ideals of the deposition-discovery portions of the Federal Rules .

.

. would be

stripped of much of their meaning.10
Literal application of the suggestions implicit in this passage
would make the work product protection meaningless; it would
be difficult indeed to imagine material which might not "give
clues as to the existence or location of relevant facts," or be
"useful for purposes of impeachment or corroboration."
Notwithstanding this ambiguity, it was apparent that the
Court did not contemplate a purely ephemeral protection. Its
ruling that material developed for trial by an attorney is not
absolutely protected from discovery by an attorney-client
7. 329 U.S. at 511.
8. Free discovery of all factual information is suggested in various passages and phrases, scattered throughout the opinion. Id. at 501,
504, 507, 508, 513. But at one point, the Court suggests that discovery
should be available "where relevant and non-privileged facts remain
hidden in an attorney's file and where production of those facts is
essential to the preparationof one's case." Id. at 511 (emphasis added).
9. See Part 1II(B), infra.
10. 329 U.S. at 511-12.
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privilege marked one pole; its obvious intent to restrict the
ordinary requirements of discovery set out the other. It is now
generally accepted that when the work product doctrine applies,
a party seeking discovery must show a need arising from the
particular circumstances of the individual case to overcome the
general policies against discovery; often this is summarized as
a showing of "extra good cause" by way of comparison with the
"good cause" requirement of Rule 34.11
Mr. Justice Jackson filed a concurring opinion which included an often quoted justification for work product protection: "Discovery was hardly intended to enable a learned
profession to perform its functions either without wits or on
1
wits borrowed from the adversary."'
Broad magisterial pronouncements of this order are well
suited to the infinite variety of problems to be encountered in
the operation of discovery; any attempt to prescribe a formula
for each potential difficulty would be foolhardy. What is needed
is a clear statement of the policies underlying the doctrine so
that appropriate answers may be given to novel questions posed
by actual discovery requests and objections. Unhappily, no adequate statement of these policies has been developed, although
many efforts have been made to discover them both from within
the corners of the Hickman opinion and from without. The
present effort is aimed at re-evaluating the various policies
discerned by others, with the goal of suggesting the best methods of applying-and perhaps amending-the current proposal
for amendment of the Rules.
Beginning with the Court's opinion, minimal significance
could be attributed to the Hickman decision by explaining it in
terms of a rough political judgment as to the compromise most
likely to achieve a final, general acceptance of the still new
discovery machinery, and the full professional cooperation
needed to implement it effectively. 13 The widely disparate results
11. E.g., Southern Ry. v. Lanham, 403 F.2d 119, 126-27 (5th Cir.
1968); 2A W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE
§ 652.4 (C. Wright ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as BARRON & HOLTZOFF,
FEDERAL PRACTICE].

12. 329 U.S. at 514, 516 (concurring opinion).
13. Compare Professor Sunderland's comment that liberalization of
chancery discovery practices faced obstacles in natural resistance to

change, in the lucrative litigation resulting over application of the rules,
and in the preservation of enough trial uncertainty that lawyers "might
always feel confident of having a fighting chance of success no matter
what side of any case" they might be employed to champion. Sunder-
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of the many decisions reported prior to 1947,14 and the almost
desperate struggle of the Advisory Committee to formulate a
workable resolution, 15 attest to a great general concern about
discovery of trial preparation materials.16 A faint echo of such
considerations may be found in the Court's penultimate statement that "we refuse to interpret the rules at this time" so as
to achieve the absolute right of discovery claimed by the plaintiff. Nonetheless, it is obvious that more fundamental notions
played a far more important role in the Court's analysis.
The simplest affirmative justification for work product protection which might be found within the terms suggested by
the Court is that it is somehow unfair for one party to reap
the harvest of preparatory seeds sown by his opponent. Such
a notion might be based upon an aversion to allowing the lazy
and slothful to profit from the diligence of othersyT or in a
vested-rights idea that "a lawyer is entitled to the fruits of his
labor.""'
Such notions do nothing to advance the inquiry.
Clearly no one would argue today that a court should be forced
to determine a lawsuit on the basis of inadequate information in
order to preserve for one party the advantages gained by luck,
skill, or wealth. Discovery itself rests on an impatient rejection
of any assertion of a proprietary privilege to prevail because of
unilateral ignorance; if there is some "unfairness" in unbridled
discovery, it must be sought in terms of interference with the
just disposition of litigation.' 9
land, Scope and Method of Discovery Before Trial, 42 YALE L.J. 863,
868 (1933).
14. The cases are collected in the notes of the Advisory Committee
accompanying the 1946 proposal to amend Rule 30 (b). See 5 F.R.D. 433,
457-60 (1946); 4 MOoRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE f 30.01[4].
15. The difficulties encountered by the Advisory Committee are
reflected in the nature of its original draft proposals, in open requests
for assistance, and in the wide spectrum of views held by various
members of the Committee. See 4 MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcTIcEf 26.23[6];
Pepper, Discovery Procedure Symposium, 5 F.R.D. 403, 406-07, 430
(1946). William D. Mitchell, chairman of the committee, attempted
to justify submission of the proposal transmitted to the Court without
first offering it for preliminary consideration by the bar at large on
the ground that the members of the Court "are competent to take care
of themselves." 71 A.B.A. Rep. 80, 85 (1946).
16. See, e.g., Armstrong, Report of the Advisory Committee, 5
F.R.D. 339, 356 (1946); 32 A.B.A.J. 882-83 (1946).
17. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Palmer, 29 F. Supp. 585, 586 (E.D.N.Y.),
aff'd, 113 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 680 (1940).
18. Hawkins, Federal Discovery Procedure-AnotherLook at Rule
34, 25 TExAs L. REV. 276, 283 (1947).
19. It is accepted, indeed, that within vaguely defined limits one
party may impose a burden on the other to uncover information not
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In searching for interference with the litigation process, the
Court's stern reference to "inefficiency, unfairness and sharp
practices," and its clarion cry against demoralizing the legal
profession, make heady reading.20 Unfortunately, they add
nothing but an obscuring color of rhetoric to the implicit proposition that the adversary system of litigation cannot function in
an atmosphere of complete candor; if no one mourns the sporting theory of justice, still there must be an area of gamesmanship in which fear of the unknown enforces an honesty
which mere ethics could not achieve. The fact that litigation
has remained adversarial in form and an operational reality
must be thought to be responsible for generating pressure toward winning representation, which could lead to dishonest
tactics if there were no limits on discovery.
Lacking any basis in controllable or even measurable experience to test such a fear about the effects of discovery, it
would be difficult to quarrel with it except by advancing an
intuition that no such special protection is really needed. And
intuition tugs at least as strongly toward the proposition that
discovery can best serve the ultimate truth-finding purposes of
the adversary system if its equalizing function is subject to
some such limitations.21 As long as the attorney is charged with
the duty of presenting the most favorable case possible for his
client, there will be the temptations and impetus of advocacy to
strain his ultimate obligation to justice as well as to victory. Perfect knowledge of every item of proof and argument, of the
complete trial "strategy" of opposing counsel, would often resultunconsciously, in most cases-in a development of position and response calculated to impede rather than advance the search for
whatever truth ex post inquiry can attain.
This fundamental basis for protection will be examined
further in Part III below, under the headings "hard-core work
product" and "impeachment material," with the purpose of detailing its implications for the appropriate scope of protection.
immediately available at the time discovery is sought. E.g., 4 MooRE,
f 33.20, 36.04[5].

FEDERAL PRACTICE

20. Similarly undifferentiated notions are apparently accepted by
the Advisory Committee. The Pammmma. DRAFT, at 24, states that the
proposal ".... reflects the view... that one side should not automatically
have the benefit of the detailed preparatory work of the other side."
Compare Rosenberg, Changes Ahead in Federal Pretrial Discovery,
45 F.R.D. 481, 492 (1968): "The concern is that the lawyer's morale be
protected as he performs his professional functions. .. "
21. See, e.g., Kane, The Work-Product Doctrine-Cornerstone of
the Adversary System, 31 INs. CouNs. J. 130 (1964).
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Many other explanations of the work product doctrine have been
offered, however, and should be examined first in order that
their implications may be compared with those of the explanation just noted and with the current operations of federal discovery.
II.
A.

WORK PRODUCT OF THE COMMENTATORS

"SHARP PRACTICES"

Although a great deal has been written about the work
product doctrine over the last 20 years, only a few commentators have discussed the Court's vague allusion to the "sharp
practices" which might result from unlimited discovery. It
has been suggested that lawyers would simply lie about information uncovered by their own investigations, 22 insert false
statements or misleading memoranda in their files, or that their
ingenuity might in some other way "prove equal to the situation." 23 The paucity of comment in this area reflects the lack
of importance of the anticipated danger of evasion, which of
itself furnishes no more reason for limiting discovery of trial
preparation materials than any other kind of information. If
there is greater reason to fear cheating in the work product area
than any other area of discovery, it must be because attorneys
believe that the intrusion of discovery into its sacred groves is
more unwarranted. If discovery is in fact unwarranted, protection should be given. But to whatever extent discovery is
otherwise found to be proper, it should be made available with
suitable sanctions for evasion.

B. ORAL STATEIENTS
Other nonjudicial comment has been directed at considerations passed over in the preceding discussion of the Hickman
opinion itself. Both the Court, and Justice Jackson in his concurring opinion, dealt at some length with the undesirable consequences which could result from discovery of unwritten information which had remained in an attorney's memory. It was
feared that since inconsistencies would inevitably appear between an attorney's recollection of an oral statement given
22. Gardner, Agency Problems in the Law of Attorney-Client Privilege: Privilege and "Work Product" Under Open Discovery (Part II),
42 U. DET. L.J. 253, 269 (1965).

23. Cleary, Hickman v. Jencks, Jurisprudence of the Adversary
System, 14 VAN. L. REv. 865, 869 (1961).
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by a witness, and the witness' subsequent testimony at trial,
the attorney's version would be offered to impeach the witness,
with the added insinuation that if the witness were not lying,
then the attorney must be. Even apart from the dangers of
attaching undue significance to possibly meaningless inconsistencies, it was quite properly thought improvident to force an
attorney to switch from his role as advocate to the role of witness. This fancied danger does not require extended discussion,
however, for the remedy is as obvious as the danger itself-discovery could be allowed, subject to an absolute bar against using
the material discovered at trial for any purpose.
Prohibiting trial use of oral statements obtained by discovery does not fully answer the further objection that forcing
the attorney to reveal detrimental information is apt to undermine his client's confidence in him.24 The only apparent distinction in this respect between discovery of unprivileged oral
statements and of other factual information uncovered by the
attorney, however, is that the client is more apt to feel betrayed because it is safer to lie with respect to oral statements.
This marginal distinction can hardly be reason enough to prevent discovery.

C. DETERRENCE OF WRITTEN PREPARATION
An immediate response to the rule against trial use of oral
statements discovered from an attorney is that it would reinforce another risk of discovery, so that "much of what is now
written would remain unwritten." 25 Although little has been
written about this risk, Professor James has observed that the
fear of discovery should not significantly deter preparation of
statements by investigating agents since "a party needs written
statements signed by the witnesses to tie them down to their
early, presumably unrehearsed, versions of the occurrence," and
since even the simple act of omitting unfavorable parts of the
statement will destroy any effectiveness the writing might
have for impeachment purposes. 26 While Professor James was
refering to statements obtained by investigating agents rather
than counsel, the importance of securing complete witness state27
ments is the same whether attorney or agent is involved.
24. The importance of work product protection in maintaining
client confidence is stressed in Gardner, supra note 22, at 272-73.
25. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947).
26. F. JAwms, CIr. PRocEaURE 206 (1965).

27. Expert trial lawyers regularly emphasize the great importance
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Thus, this observation may be counted as an expression of
doubt that discovery would significantly deter preparation of
28
written statements.
A more elaborate argument may also be urged for the
proposition that discovery would not deter written preparation,
although it may be too elaborate to accord with the probable
reasoning of an attorney actually engaged in the course of dayto-day trial preparation and discovery. Whether or not present
rules are appropriate, it is well established that written witness
29
statements are discoverable upon a showing of sufficient cause.
If the circumstances are such that discovery would be allowed
of a written statement-as for example if a deponent cannot
remember significant details of the events in question-there is
no apparent reason why discovery should not also be allowed
of an oral statement, particularly if neither the results of discovery nor the attorney's own testimony could be used at trial.
Confronted with such rules, an attorney would rarely find it
beneficial to avoid reducing a statement to writing. Any gain
which could result from this practice would have to rest on
the dual anticipation that, first, the witness' testimony would
change in the future so as to become more favorable to the
attorney's cause because unfavorable aspects had been altered or
forgotten, and that, second, the attorney himself would have honestly forgotten the previous less favorable version by the time
for discovery. This gain would have to be weighed against the
at least equally high probability that the story of the witness,
shaped as far as possible by the private suggestive questioning
of the attorney preparing to take the statement initially, would
change unfavorably under the influence of questioning by his
adversary. Thus the gains from committing the witness to a
written version should prevail so clearly over the unlikely possibility of reaping benefits from allowing the statement to remain
in oral form that written statements will be prepared as a matter
of course regardless of the rules on discovery. If discovery of
witness statements should be denied, it must be on grounds
other than the fear of deterring their preparation.
of securing written witness statements as promptly as possible. E.g.,
2 F. BUSCH, LAW AND TACTICS IN JURY TRIALS § 201 (1959); E. CuLLiNAN & H. CLARK, PREPARATION FOR TRIAL OF CIVm ACTIONS 21 (3d ed.
1956). Likewise, it is advised that an attorney warn his client not to
give written or even oral statements regarding the events involved in
the suit.

1 A. AvEPsAcH, HANDLING ACCIDENT CASES 78 (1958).

28. See Southern Ry. v. Lanham, 403 F.2d 119, 129 (5th Cir. 1968).
29. See Part 11(C), infra.
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So far as all other writings prepared in anticipation of litigation are concerned, the possibility of deterring written preparation seems even more ephemeral. Most written trial preparation materials other than witness statements should fall
within the "hard-core" area of work product protection discussed
below and are thus protected in any event. Conversely, writings
which themselves constitute evidence should be freely discoverable. Summaries of purely factual data might seem to pose
some difficulty since facts themselves are not within the scope
of work product protection. Probably the best procedure would
be to deny discovery of factual summaries as such, since all
factual information possessed by a party is subject to discovery
by other methods which avoid any need for separating fact
from protectible tactic in writings which intermingle both. The
fear of deterring written preparation adds little to the balance
in deciding these issues, and probably should not be considered
as a separate factor in approaching other specific problems,
notwithstanding its inclusion in the Hickman opinion.
D.

DETERRENCE OF ADEQUATE INVESTIGATION

Beyond the comments suggested more or less directly by the
Court's opinion, efforts have been undertaken to explain the
work product doctrine in terms which run parallel to the opinion
without really drawing from it. ° This analysis seeks to draw a
somewhat different line of tension between the functioning of
the adversary system and the intrusion of discovery than that
suggested above. The danger most to be feared from complete
discovery, in this view, is twofold: first, each party would be
tempted to forego investigative efforts in hopes that the other
party would develop a case to be seized ready-made through
discovery;8 1 second, a party who did investigate would be fearful of developing potentially adverse information only to have to
hand it to his opponent.3 2 Operation of such influences could
indeed destroy the efficacy of the adversary system which discovery was designed to improve. The trial itself cannot function
30. Note, Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 HARV. L. REv.
940, 1028-29 (1961).
31. This argument has been approved, with some modifications,
in Gardner, supra note 22, at 268-82. -See also Taine, Discovery of
Trial Preparations in Federal Courts, 50 CoLum. L. REv. 1026, 1047
(1950).

32. C. McCoRmcK, EvmEzcE § 100 at 202-03 (1954); Frost, The
Ascertainment of Truth by Discovery, 28 F.R.D. 89, 95 (1960): "If the
physical evidence at the scene is damaging--don't take the picture.
If the witness is obviously hostile--don't take his statement."
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well if neither party undertakes adequate pretrial investigation.
Even if each party intentionally omits only those lines of investigation which he fears will prove helpful to the other side, much
information will remain hidden. Acceptance of this analysis
would justify a wide area of work product protection designed
to prevent discovery from destroying the incentive of interest
which underlies the workings of the adversary system.3 3
There is good reason to doubt whether in fact many lawyers
would dare to curtail trial preparation activities for the reasons
thus suggested even if work product protection were given the
far-reaching scope implicit in this explanation.3 4 Professor
James has answered this explanation with the three-barreled
response that: "no party can afford to forego the kind of
preparation he believes is needed"; each party "must know the
facts as they are likely to appear at trial," and be able to evaluate the case realistically for settlement purposes; and no party
"will be willing to let his adversary get to the witnesses first
if this can be helped." 35 Although these comments were made
with regard to investigating agents, they apply with even
greater force to the attorney, since although the attorney is apt
to be more familiar with the dangers of discovery, he should
also have a far greater appreciation of the importance and
methods of thorough preparation. The pressures of adversary
litigation should ensure thorough preparation despite the existence of fact discovery; it has, indeed, been argued that better
trial preparation will result from open discovery because an
attorney would no longer be able to rely on his opponent's
33. The Advisory Committee's note to the proposed work product
provision of Rule 26(b) (3) notes that it reflects "the view ... that
each side should be encouraged to prepare independently." PREnVrDRAFT 24. Legislative acceptance of this proposition is reflected

NARY

in California's Code of Civil Procedure, § 2016(g), declaring State policy to be:
to preserve the rights of attorneys to prepare cases for trial with
that degree of privacy necessary to encourage them to prepare
their cases thoroughly and to investigate not only the favorable
but the unfavorable aspects of such cases.
34. In American Express Warehousing, Ltd. v. Transamerica Ins.
Co., 380 F.2d 277, 282 (2d Cir. 1967), Judge Feinberg noted the possibil-

ity that disclosure of work product may encourage lazy preparation,
but found that possibility "most improbable in this hotly contested litigation." One early study of the operation of discovery found only
"hints" of such results. Speck, The Use of Discovery in United States
District Courts, 60 YALE L.J. 1132, 1154-55 (1951); see W. GLASER, PRETRrAL DISCOVERY AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 197 (1968).
35. F. JAMES, CIVii PROcEDURE 206 (1965).
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ignorance of the gaps in his own preparation.3 6 Certainly there
is no risk of discouraging effective preparation in the vast majority of cases.
On the other hand, the wide divergence in the qualities and
abilities of members of the bar cautions against over-ready acceptance of a rebuttal based on the work habits of the best. It
is readily conceivable that some of the more ineffective members of the profession would be subject to the fears and temptations urged above, or even the simple desire to minimize expense and effort, and would be little loath to rely on their
adversaries to prepare their cases for them no matter how dangerous that course really is. And it is in precisely this area
that there is most to fear, since the day is not yet visible when
the outcome of lawsuits will be unaffected by the comparative
forensic abilities of adversary counsel. Likewise, it is possible
that in some cases, particularly private litigation in such areas
as antitrust and securities law, defense counsel will yield to a
temptation to postpone complete preparation until it is known
how well the plaintiff is able to prepare through intelligent
discovery or otherwise.
To whatever extent the rationale that discovery deters effective preparation for trial is accepted, finally, it entails the
conclusion that protection should be extended to trial preparation
by a litigant or agents of either the litigant or his lawyer. With
regard to work not done at the direction of counsel, to be sure,
it could be argued that protection is unnecessary since any danger of deterrence disappears in the face of a layman's ignorance of
the scope of pretrial discovery. However much this argument
might consort with the tendency to equate work product protection with the role of the attorney as advocate, the resulting
discrimination would only compound the disadvantages encountered by those seeking to help themselves through the litigative
encounter. If this explanation of work product protection is
accepted, the proposed extension of protection to materials
gathered by a party or by agents3 7 is fully justified; but as will
be noted below, rejection of this theory still leaves the way
open for extending a different scope of protection on other
36. LaFrance, Work-Product Discovery: A Critique, 68 Dicx. L.

REv. 351, 365-66, 373 (1964).

37. The protection is to extend to discovery of documents and
tangible things prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial "by or
for another party or by or for that other party's representative (including his attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) ...
PREImIINARY

DRAFT Rule 26 (b) (3).
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theories.3 8
Whatever attraction may be felt toward this theory of work
product protection, it must vanish before the overriding consideration that the price of protecting lawyers against the folly
of reliance on the other side, or suspending investigation of apparently unfavorable information, is a rule which denies discovery of factual information obtained in preparation for litigation. 39 The Court did not seem willing to countenance such
a severe limitation on discovery in Hickman, and as noted below, the lower courts have certainly not been implementing such
a limitation. Free fact discovery has been allowed because the
extent of the losses resulting from unlimited discovery must
inevitably remain a matter of conjecture, while the discovery
system itself represents a considered judgment, based on long
experience, that closing off such inquiry results in unilateral
ignorance-often mutual unilateral ignorance of different areas
of fact-and inadequate trial preparation.
The explanations of the need for work product protection
just canvassed have tended to isolate it from the rich tapestry
of evolving discovery practice, although this uncertain doctrine
is closely related to many surrounding questions which are
being resolved in favor of discovery. The lessons suggested by
judicial reaction to these problems are by far the most useful
source of instruction as to what the work product doctrine has
become, and what it should be. By way of summary anticipation of the ensuing discussion, the main lesson seems to be
that the doctrine is much less mysterious, and less significant,
than might be guessed by examining the tortured struggles it
has caused.

38. It is not entirely clear whether this theory is responsible
for inclusion of this provision in the proposed Rule. The comments of
the Advisory Committee seem to indicate that it accepts the theory of
work product protection that "each side should be encouraged to prepare independently," PaREnvZmARY DRAFT 24. The further comment that
the strength of the showing needed to overcome the proposed protection
may vary with the extent of the attorney's involvement in developing
the materials, id. 24, 26, may only be intended to suggest that an ad
hoc judgment be made whether discovery is likely to deter the particular pattern of trial preparation involved.
39. This consequence is cheerfully accepted in the Developmerts note discussed above. The clearest statement is that "discovery
of specific factual material collected by the lawyer's industry should
in most cases be denied. . . 2"Note, supra note 30, at 1040. But see id. at
1034-35, where a more ambiguous position is suggested.
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III. WORK PRODUCT OF THE JUDGES
A.

HARD-CORE WORK PRODUCT

Some of the areas in which the work product doctrine
forecloses discovery are easily comprehended under other principles as well. One obvious example is the need for protection
against forced revelation of a party's evaluation of his case; as
long as voluntary settlement is encouraged, it would be an intolerable intrusion on the bargaining process to allow one party
to take advantage of the other's assessment of his prospects
for victory and an acceptable settlement figure. 40 Discovery,
moreover, would soon become self-defeating as lawyers would
quickly become accustomed to formulation of only the most
glowing prospects for success. Such distortion would in turn inhibit actual settlement, as even the habitual fictionalization of
unduly optimistic forecasts would erect barriers to agreement
in the form of expectations heightened by those forecasts, notwithstanding the conscious purpose of creating a bargaining
facade.
Much more difficulty is encountered in attempting to deal
with discovery of what may loosely be termed matters of trial
strategy. On first reaction, it might be tempting to dismiss
such discovery as a request for information which is simply
irrelevant to preparing the discoverer's case for trial. For example, the identity of witnesses the opposing party intends to call
at trial might seem irrelevant since he can be compelled to
name all persons known to him to have knowledge of the matters involved in the suit. Similarly, discovery of legal theories
might seem irrelevant in view of the discoverability of the factual
information on which such theories are built.
Little reflection is needed to show the failure of this easy
attempt to resolve the problem.41 Discovery, as the Court
noted in its Hickman opinion,42 has been developed as an important supplement to "notice" pleadings, not only in the function
of fact disclosure but in the function of issue formulation as
well. Improved knowledge of the facts generated by discovery
4
improves the basis for predicting the range of potential issues, 3
40. See Southern Ry. v. Lanham, 403 F.2d 119, 131-32 (5th Cir.
1968). Compare Slifka Fabrics v. Providence Wash. Ins. Co., 19 F.R.D.
374 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
41. See 4 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE f 34.08, at 2482: "Quite clearly
all such materials are relevant."
42. 329 U.S. at 501.
43. E.g., James, The Revival of Bills of Particulars Under the
Federal Rules, 71 HARv. L. REv. 1473, 1483 (1958).

1284

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:1269

but it does little to reveal which issues will actually be in controversy, and the insurance it provides against emergence of
"surprise" issues would operate perfectly only if all lawyers had
perfect legal knowledge or infallible means of attaining that
nonexistent paradigm.
(1)

Discovery of Legal Theories and Contentions

Rules against discovering the opposing party's legal theories,
moreover, take their toll in the arena of factual knowledge as
well as the arena of issue formulation. At the present time
courts will not allow a request, in a single interrogatory, for
all of the information available to the other side which bears on
the case. 44 Instead, the very most that is allowed is a request
for all the facts bearing on individually specified issues. Such
discovery is of course limited by the ability of inquiring counsel
to conjure up the issues-if he fails to consider an issue while
thinking about the case in the abstract, he may never acquire
the factual information which would suggest it.
Perhaps in response to such considerations the very steady
trend of current opinion departs from earlier reluctance to
allow discovery of the theories and contentions of counsel and
allows it quite specifically.
The most basic justification ordinarily advanced is that issue
formulation is one of the two fundamental purposes of discovery. 45 This justification is in turn expanded by noting
that discovery is a better means of uncovering an opponent's
position than is a motion for a more definite statement of his
pleadings, 46 or by observing that the ambiguous generality of
many pleadings, while acceptable uider current practice, creates
a great need for further specification if meaningful trial pre47
paration is to be possible.
Several courts have allowed discovery of opinions, contentions or theories on the more general ground that it serves a
44. An attempt to achieve such discovery was roundly denounced
in Uinta Oil Ref. Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 226 F. Supp. 495, 500-01,
504 (D. Utah 1964).
45. E.g., Albano v. United States, 26 F.R.D. 20, 21 (S.D.N.Y.
McElroy v. United Air Lines, Inc., 21 F.R.D. 100, 102 (W.D. Mo.
46. E.g., B-H Transp. Co. v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 44
436, 439 n.2 (N.D.N.Y. 1968); cf. Chatman v. American Export

1960);
1957).
F.R.D.
Lines,

20 F.R.D. 176, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) ("this is nothing more than used to

be asked in a bill of particulars").
47. E.g., B-H Transp. Co. v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 44 F.R.D.
436, 439 (N.D.N.Y. 1968); Microtron Corp. v. Minnesota Min. & Mfg. Co.,
269 F. Supp. 22, 26 (D.N.J. 1967).
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substantial purpose in enabling the inquiring party to prepare
for trial. 48 Some of the purposes which might be served are
suggested by the following statement of one court:
. there is a noticeable trend toward permitting such interrogatories if the court is convinced that by requiring responses
thereto the lawsuits could be expedited, the information obtained
could lead to relevant evidence, the issues could be narrowed,
unnecessary testimony and wasteful preparation could be
avoided, or any other substantial purpose
sanctioned by the
49
*

discovery provisions. .

could be served.

These positive purposes are further reinforced by the observation that in any event it is often difficult and unrewarding
to attempt to distinguish between fact and opinion. 0
The vehicle for discovering specific contentions has occasionally been deposition of a party. One extreme decision required the president of a corporate plaintiff to answer complicated antitrust questions as to the plaintiff's contentions regarding the fairness of prices charged; the existence of competition between various firms, and the factors relied upon to
determine whether such competition existed; and the reasonableness of certain competitive practices. 51 Ordinarily, however,
it is recognized that a party is usually not able to define his
legal position-that "that is what lawyers are for," so that such
information should be sought by interrogatory rather than on
52
oral deposition.
Recognition that the attorney is responsible for contentions
48. E.g., Carrier Mfg. Co. v. Rex Chainbelt, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 717,
718 (E.D. Wis. 1968); Acuff-Rose Publications, Inc. v. Silver Star Publishing Co., 11 FED. RuLEs SERv. 2D 33.351, Case 1 (M.D. Tenn. 1967).
Many of the cases allowing discovery in this area rely on Professor
Moore's long-urged contention that discovery should be allowed whenever it would accomplish any substantial purpose. E.g., Wilmington
Country Club v. Horwath & Horwath, 12 FED. RULEs SEuv. 2D 33.314,
Case 1 (E.D. Pa. 1969).

See 4 MooRE,

FEDERAL

PRACTICE

1 26.16[4],

33.17.
49. Empire Scientific Corp. v. Pickering & Co., 44 F.R.D. 5, 6
(E.D.N.Y. 1968).
50. E.g., Diversified Prods. Corp. v. Sports Center Co., 42 F.R.D.
3, 4 (D. Md. 1967).
51. Broadway & Ninety-Sixth St. Realty Co. v. Loew's, Inc., 21
F.R.D. 347, 360 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). See also Pacific Intermountain Express
Co. v. Acme Carriers, Inc., 30 F.R.D. 525, 526 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
52 Lance, Inc. v. Ginsburg, 32 F.R.D. 51, 53 (E.D. Pa. 1962). See
also Microtron Corp. v. Minnesota Min. & Mfg. Co., 269 F. Supp. 22, 25
(D.N.J. 1967). Occasionally, the requirement that interrogatories be
answered under oath by the party has been found to provide a basis
for denying inquiry into legal theories by interrogatories as well.
See United States v. Selby, 25 F.R.D. 12, 14 (N.D. Ohio 1960), and
note 58, infra.
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and theories, and that interrogatories-and requests for admissions 5 3 -are the proper mode of discovery in this area, returns the question squarely to the work product arena. Surprisingly few opinions attempt to reconcile discovery of this
nature with the work product doctrine, possibly because it is so
clear that the doctrine is indeed inapplicable. The most common example of discovery of contentions involves a request for
a statement of the specific acts of negligence which will be4
relied upon to support a conclusional allegation of negligence.
In upholding such a request, one court has rejected a work
product objection on the grounds that "it is everyday experience"
that the operation of a lawyer's mind is needed to frame pleadings-including the allegation of negligence-and answers to
interrogatories, and that allowing a work product objection to
prevail "would be to adopt an unrealistic view of litigation and
'
to ignore the role of the lawyer in carrying it forward."55
This conclusion that the work product doctrine is inapposite
to discovery of contentions mingling fact and law applies with
equal force to discovery of legal theories as such. A request
for a statement of the legal theories upon which a plaintiff intends to rely involves an even smaller intrusion into areas deserving work product protection than, for instance, a request
for a statement of all of the ways in which the plaintiff claims
the defendant was negligent. Identification of legal theories,
after all, was a thoroughly accepted part of traditional practice,
and there has never been room for an argument that one party
ought to be able to preserve "surprise" legal issues for trial.
Notwithstanding this fact, virtually all cases allowing discovery
of contentions involve a quest for the factual contentions sup53. Unfortunately, a substantial number of decisions have ruled
that requests for admissions under Rule 36 may not be addressed to
facts in dispute between the parties, particularly in the context of such
ultimate facts as negligence. E.g., Kasar v. Miller Printing Mach. Co.,
36 F.R.D. 200, 203 (W.D. Pa. 1964); Wedding v. Tallant Transfer Co., 37
F.R.D. 8, 11 (N.D. Ohio 1963); Lehmann v. Harner, 31 F.R.D. 303 (D.

Md. 1962). A better view is shown in Tillman v. Fickencher,
F.R.D. 512, 513 (E.D. Pa. 1960). The proposed amendments to Rule
make it clear that such requests are proper. A similar uncertainty
to the suitability of Rule 36 as a device for ferreting out opinions

27
36
as
or

36.04[4].
contentions is discussed in 4 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
54. E.g., Miller v. United States, 192 F. Supp. 218 (D. Del. 1961);

B. & S. Drilling Co. v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., 24 F.R.D. 1,
3 (S.D. Tex. 1959); Smith v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 18 F.R.D. 169, 179
(M.D. Pa. 1955); Maryland ex rel. Peters v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 7
F.R.D. 666 (E.D. Pa. 1947).

55. Hartsfield v. Gulf Oil Corp., 29 F.R.D. 163, 165 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
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porting identified legal theories. 6 And even recent cases have
rejected such attempts to develop discovery into a compulsory
system of pretrial memoranda as a request that a defendant
state the grounds underlying a defense that the complaint fails
57
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Further examination of the discovery of purely legal positions may best be set against the background of concern expressed by eminent scholars that even cases allowing discovery
of mixed factual-legal contentions have gone too far. Professor
James has argued that such discovery represents a relapse into
the fatally seductive toils of special pleading in which the benefits of clearer definition of the contested issues are achieved
only at the prohibitive expense of freezing the issues to those
58
thus defined, and ultimately defeating justice.
Two answers readily present themselves to this concern.
The first is obvious-the danger of issue stagnation is created
only if courts insist on adherence to the issues formulated in
discovery, and can be avoided by denying any binding effect to
the issues thus developed except in cases of obvious bad faith.
This is what the courts now appear to be doing.
Cases dealing with discrepancies between a party's clearly
factual answers to interrogatories or depositions and his later
trial testimony have established that the party is not bound by
prior answers; instead, "the finder of fact must weigh all of the
answers and resolve the conflict." 59 This result obtains even
when there is no apparent justification for the change of po56. But compare Bynum v. United States, 36 F.R.D. 14 (E.D. La.
1964) (requiring plaintiff to respond to an interrogatory by stating
whether reliance would be placed exclusively on a theory of res ipsa
loquitur, or whether specific acts of negligence would also be alleged)
with Cleminshaw v. Beech Aircraft Co., 21 F.R.D. 300, 302 (D.Del. 1957)
(inquiry whether plaintiff will rely on res ipsa loquitur would invade
work product of counsel).
57. Jones v. Goldstein, 41 F.R.D. 271, 273 (D. Md. 1966).
58. F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE 215-17 (1965); James, supra note 43,
at 1473. Favorable comment on this view may be found in 2A BARRON
& HOLTzOFr, FEDERAL PRAc icE § 768. Professor James adds the argument that it is inappropriate to require a party to answer under oath
interrogatories as to contentions which will be developed by counsel.
71 HARv. L. REv. 1478; see United States v. Selby, 25 F.R.D. 12, 14
(N.D. Ohio 1960). A fair response is made in Microtron Corp. v.
Minnesota Min. & Mfg. Co., 269 F. Supp. 22, 25 (D.N.J. 1967), that "we
all know that today, [no client] would undertake to supply answers
to technical interrogatories without the assistance of counsel."
59. Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Stockton Stevedoring Co., 388 F.2d 955,
959 (9th Cir. 1968).
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sition because of the acquisition of additional information. 60 And
if it can be shown that the original answer was given in good
faith reliance on information later discovered to be incorrect,
permission may even be given to amend the answer.6 1
Fewer cases deal with the possible preclusive effect of answers to interrogatories eliciting opinions, contentions, or legal
theories. 2 One court has concluded that although such interrogatories and their answers do serve as adjuncts to the pleadings, "it is not their function to limit a party's proof in the way
that pleadings do," because additional information may be acquired after the answers are given and "the discovery rules are
not to be employed as a stratagem to maneuver an adverse
party into an unfavorable position.163

Other courts have ruled

that answers based on a plaintiff's present knowledge cannot
be used to force him to an election between inconsistent theories
of recovery,6 4 although one judge has indicated that he would
expect the plaintiff answering a request for his construction of
the patent in suit to amend his answer "were a change in his
understanding or his contentions to warrant it, . . . in accordance with his continuing obligation to keep the answers to all
interrogatories as up to date as possible." 65

These decisional developments are reflected in the proposed
amendments to the discovery rules. Rule 33(b) is to provide
that interrogatories are not objectionable merely because answers
60. E.g., Merchants Motor Freight v. Downing, 227 F.2d 247, 251
(8th Cir. 1955); Anderson v. Phoenix Prods. Co., 127 F. Supp. 732,
737 (E.D. Wis. 1954), aff'd on other grounds, 226 F.2d 191 (7th Cir. 1955)
(witness persuaded court that discrepancies were due to confusion
and inadequate study of available records).
61. E.g., Ray v. J.C. Penney Co., 274 F.2d 519, 521 (10th Cir. 1959).
62. General discussion may be found in 2A BARRON & HOLTZOFF,
FEDERAL PRACTICE § 778; 4 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ff 33.29[2].
63. McElroy v. United Air Lines, Inc., 21 F.R.D. 100, 102 (W.D. Mo.
1957).
64. Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Texas Okla. Express, Inc., 43 F.R.D. 336,
338 (W.D. Okla. 1967). See also Hanover Shoe, Inc., v. United Shoe
Mach. Corp., 6 FED. RULES SERV. 2D 33.471, Case 1 (M.D. Pa. 1962); Hamilton v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 23 F.R.D. 101 (S.D. Ind. 1958). Compare
Alamo Theatre Co. v. Loew's Inc., 22 F.R.D. 42, 45 (N.D. Ill. 1958) (striking allegations from complaint on the basis of plaintiff's inability to offer
any information supporting them in response to interrogatories and
limiting discovery to the issues remaining in the complaint):
...
the non-existence of knowledge or information in the
plaintiff's possession to support its stated cause of action should
not be used to subject a defendant to the complete burden of
supplying those specific facts necessary to the preparation of
the plaintiff's case.
65. Montecatini Edison v. Rexall Drug & Chem. Co., 288 F. Supp.
486, 491 (D. Del. 1968).
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would involve "an opinion, contention, or legal conclusion," although there is express provision for judicial control over the
time of answering. The notes state that answers to such interrogatories will not limit trial issues undesirably, since "the interrogating party will ordinarily not be entitled to rely on the
unchanging character of the answers he receives and cannot
base prejudice on such reliance."66
The proposed amendments to Rule 36 treat this problem in
what may at first seem a curiously inconsistent manner. Rule
36(a) is to allow requests for admission "of the truth of any
matters within the scope of Rule 26(b)," which refers in general terms to discovery of "any matter, not privileged, which is
relevant to the subject matter involved ... ." The note to Rule
36 makes it clear that this embraces matters of opinion and legal
conclusion, and stresses the purpose of "enabling the requesting party to avoid the burdensome accumulation of proof prior
to the pretrial conference," by giving an admission "a conclusively binding effect, . . . comparable to an admission in
"...
,67 A binding effect of some sort
pleadings or a stipulation .
eases the burden of preparation, but this seems at odds with the
recognition that answers to interrogatories should not be given
any such effect because the advantages are obtained at the expense of just adjudication. Apparently it is not actually intended that answers to requests for admission will be given
substantially different effect. Proposed Rule 36(b) includes the
power to "permit withdrawal or amendment when the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby,"
and prejudice cannot be shown by the party requesting the
admission. The note also states that Rule 36 makes it clear that
"admissions function very much as pleadings do." 68 These provisions and comments, taken jointly, appear to provide for a
second round of pleading after pretrial preparations have progressed substantially. Standards for amendment are then sim66. PRELnvINARY DRAFT 61, 64-66.
67. Id. at 79, 83. McSparran v. Hanigan, 225 F. Supp. 628 (E.D.
Pa. 1963), cited in the notes, explains a determination to enter judgment
notwithstanding the verdict on the basis of the plaintiff's answers to
requests to admit by relying directly on the analogy between such requests and "the older style pleading in which so-called ultimate facts
were alleged under oath . . . and were conclusively taken to be true
unless specifically denied."

Id. at 637.

A highly similar approach was

actually taken in United States v. Lemons, 125 F. Supp. 686, 688-90
(W.D. Ark. 1954), cited in the notes as an example of cases treating
responses to requests for admissions as the equivalent of sworn testimony.
68. PREIMNARY DRAFT 81.
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ilar to those in present Rule 15, after allowance for a presumption that there is less excuse for sloppy pleading after the
case has passed through the preliminary rounds.
This second round of pleading might prove a marginally
useful addition to the arsenal of issue-formulating procedures
provided by initial and amended pleadings formally denominated as such, other discovery devices, and pretrial conferences,
particularly in very complex cases. In more ordinary litigation,
this device might also serve as a substitute for formal pretrial
conferences. The fact that an admission is to be made "for
purposes of the pending action only" may add an additional
margin of utility because there is no danger of unforeseen future
effects. It seems more likely, however, that the main justification for the proposed procedure lies in the often hopeless and
usually fruitless task of drawing boundary lines around separate
provinces of "fact," "opinion," and "legal conclusions." If so,
there appears to be no reason to apply stricter standards of deviation (variance?) to answers to requests for admission than to answers to interrogatories, except that the purpose of fostering reliance on the answers in trial preparation justifies a higher degree
of rigor in insisting on a request for leave to amend when changes
appear desirable. And it certainlzy would be a long step backward to use in this context the provisions of Rule 37 (c), whichin the language of the proposed amendment-require a court to
impose on the party failing to admit a requested "matter" payment of "the reasonable expenses ... including reasonable attorney's fees" incurred in proving it at trial, unless it is found that
there was "good reason for the failure to admit or . . .the admission sought was of no substantial importance." 69 The note
to this provision should be supplemented by an express statement that only in the rarest circumstances can it be found that
there was no good reason for failure to admit matters of opinion
or legal conclusion.
Finally, concern has been expressed that an attorney may
feel psychologically precluded from adopting theories and contentions not earlier revealed during discovery for fear of appear69. See, e.g., Peck v. Clesi, 37 F.R.D. 11, 12 (N.D. Ohio 1963), sustaining objections to requests for admission going to:
the major areas of dispute between the parties. A request for
admissions as to disputed facts appears to be nothing more
than an attempt by one party, in anticipation of a favorable
verdict at trial, to lay a foundation for transferring to the
other party a large part of the costs of the lawsuit, pursuant to
Rule 37 (c) .... Such an attempt will not be permitted.

1969]

WORK PRODUCT OF THE RULESMAKERS

1291

ing irresponsible or dishonest to judges and fellow attorneys, 70
even though no formal rules bar such a course. Although categorical demonstration is impossible, this fear seems chimerical in
light of the twin facts that imbalances of advocacy rarely err in
the direction of reticence, and that the changes of position forced
on conscientious advocacy by changing facts are well recognized
on all sides.
The second answer to the fears expressed by Professor
James is that refusal to attribute binding effect to issues developed in discovery does not result in denial of any beneficial results. Such discovery is not intended to promote trial "efficiency" by eliminating possible issues at the expense of doing justice on the actual facts. 71 Instead, it is designed to ensure that
one side does not come to trial unprepared to meet issues which
could have been met if they had been anticipated; efficiency will
be promoted only by averting the need to prepare to meet issues
so flimsy that they can be eliminated even during discovery
stages. These advantages are, to be sure, somewhat speculative.
Potentially available issues are not likely to be conceded in discovery, particularly during the early phases of a suit, and the ordinary suit may not involve such factual uncertainties or legal
complexities as to raise much danger that real issues will be overlooked.7 2 Recognition of the resulting danger that the burdens
of discovery may outweigh the possible benefits is undoubtedly
responsible for the provisions in the current amendment proposals that theories and contentions may be sought by discovery,
but that the court may order postponement of the answers until
later stages of discovery, including pretrial proceedings.73
70. Gardner, supra note 22, at 275.
71. Compare James, supra note 43, at 1485:
the right of amendment would . .. take away whatever value
particulars might have in promoting efficiency or fairness.

If

on the other hand conditions are to be put on amendment, then

the additional protection for the adversary will frequently have

to be bought at the cost either of injustice or of inefficiency.

72. THE COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PROJECT FOR EFFECTIVE JUSTICE, FIELD
SURVEY OF FEDERAL PRETRIAL DISCOVERY: REPORT TO THE ADVISORY CoMMITTEE ON RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (1965)
[hereinafter cited as

COLUMBIA REPORT] reports that discovery does not appear to lead to
greater agreement between the parties, and that on the whole it appears
to result in a greater addition of new issues than deletion of issues.
Id. at X. 14-15. But to the extent that relevant issues are added, there
is little reason to suppose that-unless the law making them relevant

is unjust-the effect is undesirable.
73. PRELnN=ARY DRAFT Rules 33 (b), 36 (a). Some courts have al-

ready asserted the power to postpone the time for answers. E.g., Diversified Prods. Corp. v. Sports Center Co., 42 F.R.D. 3, 4-5 (D. Md. 1967)

(Thomsen, C.J.).

Others have simply refused to order responses to
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These provisions for postponement of answers lead back to
the question whether any benefit would result from allowig discovery of the legal theories which a party intends to
assert, as well as the specific factual contentions which will be
used to support them. It is not clear whether the proposed
amendments are intended to allow discovery to be used for this
purpose. Proposed Rule 33 allows discovery of an "opinion,
contention, or legal conclusion," language which could refer
either to pure legal assertions or factual conclusions which support identified legal theories. The notes of the Advisory Committee refer to cases involving "factual conclusions" and contentions or other inquiries which "in some measure call for legal
conclusions," and distinguish these proper questions from those
relating to "issues of 'pure law,' i.e., legal issues unrelated to the
facts of the case."7 4 Legal theories to be asserted would appear
to be related to the case, but it may be intended that discovery
is to be available only along the lines of present practice, involving a statement of the relationship between identified legal
theories and facts to be asserted.
On the other side of the benefit equation lie the costs of
requiring discovery. Although it is difficult to object to a requirement which encourages clear development of legal theories,
an obvious problem is presented when a party is unable to
determine, early in the suit, what legal theories will eventually
be relied upon. Such problems are most likely to occur in
complex litigation in which most of the evidence is in the hands
of the defendant and must be obtained by discovery, but they
could also occur in more ordinary litigation. Even in a "simple"
accident case, it would be possible to proceed on a theory of
negligence, or of some aggravated form of unintentional misconduct, or even of intentional battery. Probably such cases
can be best handled by accepting a discovery response that the
party does not yet know what theories will be relied upon.
A closely related problem is presented by changes in theories,
which result from the availability of new factual information,
from new developments in the law while the suit is pending, or
simply from fresh inspiration. As an illustrative example, a
person injured by the collapse of a chair might intend to bring
suit simply on a theory of strict liability or breach of warranty.
If asked for his theories early in the development of the case,
queries designed to freeze an opponent's contentions at an unreasonably early stage of the proceedings. E.g., United States v. Carter Prods.,
Inc., 28 F.R.D. 373, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
74. PRmEnmVmARY DRAFT 65.
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he would so state. Discovery of his theories early in the suit
would enable the defendant to prepare to meet the issues thus
raised, and to avoid the need to prepare to establish that the
chair was designed and constructed with an appropriate degree
of care. Following extensive preparation of his case, however,
the plaintiff might wish to add a claim for negligent design.
Surely he would be allowed to do so, thereby forcing the defendant to trace through the steps which had been omitted
earlier, perhaps at some disadvantage because of the lapse of
time. Even if the issues first appeared at trial, there would
be strong pressure to allow them to be raised if it were possible
to provide the defendant with an opportunity to meet them by
continuance or mistrial. The fact that such problems are not
likely to occur very often, because litigants would habitually
respond to discovery with all remotely reasonable theories,
simply underscores the question whether any benefits are apt
to be obtained.
It is submitted that the fact that discovery of legal theories
may often accomplish nothing does not justify its prohibition.
The possibly small measure of accomplishment must be weighed
against the ordinarily slight burden imposed. Although in many
situations a party will be unable to specify any theories early in
the suit, and new theories will often emerge as the suit progresses, there will also be many situations in which it is possible
to specify theories at the outset and to stick by them. The issue
of negligent design, for instance, may often remain out of collapsing chair cases. As long as a great deal of flexibility is allowed
in deviating from the issues developed in discovery-and probably the only appropriate limitation is one of willful bad faiththe benefits of obtaining a preliminary, even though tentative,
specification of issues weigh in favor of allowing discovery. The
discretionary power to dispense with such discovery entirelyor to postpone it to become an effective substitute for more
formal pretrial procedures-should be sufficient protection
against significant waste motion.
Adoption of this procedure does not seem likely to result in
undue burdens on the courts-uncomplicated suits will probably
be handled by use of stock questions and answers, while attorneys involved in more complicated suits are apt to be guided
both by formal pretrial conference procedures and by the realization that premature attempts to define the issues narrowly
would yield only general answers and prompt retaliation.7 5
75. The fear is still expressed that the discovery provisions of the
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Protectionof Trial Strategy

This development of discovery in the area of legal theories
and contentions represents an inroad on areas that may once
have been thought protected, but it is not the harbinger of
complete revelation of all phases of trial strategy. The objections
to completely open discovery extend beyond the danger of premature efforts to define positions before discovery and pretrial
have made some degree of commitment desirable. The more
obvious of these objections is that the dangers of overblown
discovery assume a different relation to the possible benefits
once the category of "issues and contentions" is put behind. A
particularly diligent or nervous lawyer might request, for instance, that opposing counsel furnish a running account of all
statutes, cases, and authorities consulted, theories developed,
questions to be put to trial witnesses, and so on. Such blatant
abuse would rarely occur, but it is predictable that greater freedom would create a need for greater restraints.
Beyond the dangers of bloating discovery out of any
proportion to its worth lie more fundamental objections to
complete revelation of trial strategy. Forcing each side to make
its own analysis of a case, at least initially, may often result in a
more penetrating development of fact and law than would occur
if each side had free access to the other's strategy. There may
be some value in even the simple requirement that requests
for factual information be related to specific issues instead of a
broadside demand for all available information. How far these
possible benefits are actually realized, however, is open to
question. Since, in theory, law is equally available to both
parties, while factual information patently is not, there is considerable room for the argument that such benefits are largely
illusional.
More important consequences follow from the fact that an
adversary trial is not a precise, nor even a perfectly rational, way
of establishing historical fact. Surely no factfinding procedure
Federal Rules have been drafted with an eye to the most complex
litigation likely to come before the federal courts, and are simply overpowering for the run-of-the-mill cases constituting the vast bulk of the
courts' workload. E.g., Brueckner, An Assessment of the Worth of Pretrial Procedures, 1965 PROCEEDINGS, ABA SECTION OF INS., NEaL. &
CoMP. L. 386; Knepper, Some Suggestions for Limiting Discovery, 34
INS. CouNs. J. 398, 400 (1967). The information uncovered by the
Columbia Report suggests that in a large majority of cases, discovery
is kept within bounds reasonably related to the size and complexity of
the litigation involved. COLUMBIA REPORT 1.4.
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of purely human contrivance can be entirely accurate in determining past events which did not transpire under laboratory
conditions. Living testimony is based on imperfect recollection
of often inattentive observations, and is often subject to the
strain, conscious or otherwise, of attempting to separate observed facts from facts which it would now be convenient to
have observed. "Trial strategy" is often responsible for exacerbating these difficulties. Juries and judges are in varying degrees susceptible to the effects of skilled argument and emphasis, or selective presentation of evidence. Yet these same
tools have become an integral part of the adversary system
on the supposition that they accomplish more good than harm
in the quest after vanished fact. To some extent, the normal
devices of trial strategy are predictable and are anticipated by
each side. But as the pet anecdotes of any trial lawyer would
suggest, much of their value is thought to lie in surprise; in
the fact that they cannot be fully anticipated and countered
by maneuvers designed to dissipate their effects and to reestablish a comforting darkness. 76 Perhaps protection against discovery of such trial tactics could be afforded on the ground
that information as to them does not constitute evidence and is
not calculated to provide a lead to evidence, but it would be
difficult to refute the proposition that the only way of knowing
whether such information might lead to new evidence would be
by revealing it to the other party. Protection against pretrial
discovery of such trial plans thus forms the hard core of the
77
work product doctrine.
The implications of this central doctrine are easier to recognize in specific situations than they are to define in the abstract.
Comparatively few cases deal with efforts to penetrate this
hard core of work product by discovery, indicating the soundness of the intuitive judgment that few lawyers are likely to
seek information which is properly protectible on this theory.
Most courts will allow discovery of specific factual and legal contentions in an area which roughly corresponds to the area in
which it would be proper to propose findings of fact and ulti76. As one thoughtful observer has noted, "Work [product] protection is the major single area in which surprise is allowed ....
To the
extent that someone may be surprised . .. , he should accept it."
Frank, PretrialConferences and Discovery-Disclosure or Surprise?, 514
INs. L.J. 661, 672 (1965).
77. The Advisory Committee has limited its explanation of the
work product doctrine in these terms to the statement that the proposed
rule provision "reflects the view that the lawyer's mental impressions
should be protected." PR1IarxARY DRAFT 24.
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mate conclusions of law to a judge. On the other hand, it would
be surprising in the extreme if a party were ordered to prepare
a verbatim statement of the questions to be put to each witness
and the anticipated replies, or to divulge cross-examination
plans. Likewise, it would be clearly improper to order disclosure of the arguments to be used to persuade the factfinder
to draw particular conclusions.of fact from the evidence at trial.
Cases dealing with efforts to discover trial evidence lie close
to this area of obvious impropriety. While it is generally accepted that a party may not seek a statement of the evidence
which will be offered at trial to prove each of his opponent's
points,' 8 it is also agreed that interrogatories addressed to factual information are proper even though they seek "evidentiary
detail. '7 9 In some "big" cases, for example, it has been ruled
that a party may not be required to produce the evidence which
will be introduced at trial because of the resulting burden, confusion, and possible unfairness if the response is made the basis
for imposing a continuing duty of supplementation or exclusion
of other evidence at trial. In the same cases, however, the courts
have required identification of the facts and transactions to be
relied upon, of the documents to be offered in evidence, and the
persons known to have information about the facts so specified. 0 The distinction may blur at times, but the basic premise
appears to be that all factual information available to one party
ought to be available to the other: 8 ' given discovery of such
scope, and given the rules allowing discovery of contentions,
theories, and opinions, nothing further would be accomplished
by discovery of actual plans 'for shaping trial evidence 2 and it
might result in some harm. Here, as in other areas close to the
line, any need that may arise in complex litigation for advance
78. E.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 30 F.R.D. 358, 362 (D.R.I.
1962) ("there is nothing in the Federal Rules . . . that compels either
party to present its case in advance of trial"); Aktiebolaget Vargos v.
Clark, 8 F.R.D. 635 (D.D.C. 1949); 4 MoorE, FEDERAL PRACTICE

33.12.

79. E.g., United States v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., 36
F.R.D. 250 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); V.D. Anderson Co. v. Helena Cotton Oil Co.,
117 F. Supp. 932, 942 (E.D. Ark. 1953).

80. See United States v. Carter Prods., Inc., 28 F.R.D. 373, 376
(S.D.N.Y. 1961); United States v. Renault, Inc., 27 F.R.D. 23, 27 (S.D.
N.Y. 1960). Compare Dubois Brewing Co. v. United States, 34 F.R.D.
126, 127 (W.D. Pa. 1963)

(requiring disclosure of documents which the

plaintiff intended to rely upon at trial to establish designated allegations of the complaint).
81. See Part III (B), infra.
82. E.g., United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 25 F.R.D. 252, 255
(D.N.J. 1960).
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disclosure of trial evidence may be handled more efficiently,
and with less danger of abuse, through formal pretrial conference procedures.

83

Various problems closely related to the quest for trial evidence have also been reflected in reported cases. Occasionally a
request is made for identification of the witnesses who will be
used to prove specific matters, 84 or for revelation of the steps of
trial preparation by asking what efforts have been made to find
witnesses8 5 or by asking deponents what they have done in
preparation for deposition.8 6 On the law side of trial preparation, a few cases have found it necessary to deal with blanket
requests for all of the files relating to a case,8T or for memoranda prepared in developing a party's theoretical position.88 Denial of discovery in such circumstances is easily understandable.
A common problem which seems to fall close to the borderline involves the request that a party. identify the witnesses
who will be offered at trial. Despite an aberrational opinion
or two,8 9 it is clear that work product protection does not guard

83. E.g., Uinta Oil Ref. Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 226 F. Supp.
495, 504-05 (D. Utah 1964); Magelssen-v. Local 518, Operative Plasterers'
Ass'n, 32 F.R.D. 464, 466 (W.D. Mo. 1963).
84. E.g., Wirtz v. Howard; 7 FED. RuLES SmV. 2D 33.316, Case 1
(E.D. Ky. 1963); United States v. Renault, Inc., 27 F.R.D. 23, 29 (S.D.N.Y.
1960); Central Hide & Rendering Co. v. B-M-K Corp., 19 F.R.D. 294
(D. Del. 1956).
85. Besley-Welles Corp. v. Balax, Inc., 43 F.R.D. 368, 370-71 (E.D.

Wis. 1968); Uinta Oil Ref. Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 226 F. Supp. 495,
506 (D. Utah 1964).
86. Giordani v. Hoffman, 11 FED. RULES SERv. 2D 26b.41, Case 1
(E.D. Pa. 1968); Bercow v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 39 F.R.D. 357, 358
(S.D.N.Y. 1965). Compare Ceco Steel Prods. Co. v. H.K. Porter Co.,
31 F.R.D. 142 (N.D. Ill. 1962) (denying a request to compel answers to

deposition questions concerning a meeting of party and counsel to frame
answers to interrogatories).
87. E.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 34 F.R.D. 241,

242 (E.D. Mo. 1963); Brush v. Harkins, 9 F.R.D. 681 (S.D. Mo. 1950).

88. E.g., United States v. American Optical Co., 37 F.R.D. 233
(E.D. Wis. 1965). Compare Cummings v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., 272 F.
Supp. 9, 10 (E.D. Pa. 1967) ("statutory citations should not be sought by
interrogatory"); Tytel v. Richardson-Merrill, Inc., 37 F.R.D. 351, 354
(S.D.N.Y. 1965) (ruling that plaintiff suing for injuries claimed to have
resulted from use of defendant's drug cannot inquire into medical significance of defendant's interrogatories); Fishermen & Merchants Bank

v. Burin, 11 F.R.D. 142, 145 (S.D. Cal. 1951) (denying discovery of cita-

tions relied upon by plaintiff to establish asserted positions of English law).

89. Walczak v. Detroit-Pittsburgh Motor Freight, Inc., 140 F. Supp.

10 (N.D. Ind. 1956)

is the clearest statement; see Sunday v. Gas

Serv. Co., 10 F.R.D. 185, 186 (W.D. Mo. 1950); cf. Klop v. United Fruit
Co., 18 F.R.D. 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (discovery may reach to identity of
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against revelation of the identity of persons known to have
knowledge of the facts involved in a lawsuit, whether or not
they were discovered by counsel during preparation for trial.90
Most of the reported cases, on the other hand, have ruled that
during discovery a party need not identify the witnesses to be
called at trial. Many of these cases simply rule without explanation that such discovery is improper,91 while a few simply
rule to the contrary that discovery is proper. 92 Discovery
is normally denied on the ground that a party ought not to
be limited at trial to witnesses chosen during the early stages
of preparation and discovery. 93 This reasoning is occasionally
supplemented by the suggestion that compulsory revelation of
trial witnesses would unduly interfere with strategic planning, 94
or that a witness may not be prepared, at the time of trial, to
testify as he had previously indicated he would.9 5 Courts
allowing discovery, on the other hand, occasionally respond to
such objections by noting that the answering party should remain free to change its list as trial preparation advances.9 0
Although the response of allowing discovery with a continuing right to supplement or amend the list of witnesses might
seem to meet the objections adequately, it also raises a very real
witnesses from whom statements have been taken, but not the identity
of other persons known to have knowledge of the relevant facts).
90. E.g., Cedolia v. C.S. Hill Saw Mills, Inc., 41 F.R.D. 524 (M.D.
N.C. 1967); Roberson v. Ryder Truck Lines, Inc., 41 F.R.D. 166 (N.D.
Miss. 1966); Taylor v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 33 F.R.D. 283, 285 (W.D.
Mo. 1962); cf. Edgar v. Finley, 312 F.2d 533 (8th Cir. 1963) (discovery
of identity of witness revealed to plaintiff's attorney by another attorney
on condition that the information be concealed from defendant).
91. E.g., Wedding v. Tallant Transfer Co., 37 F.R.D. 8, 10 (N.D.
Ohio 1963); Magelssen v. Local 518, Operative Plasterers' Ass'n, 32
F.R.D. 464, 465 (W.D. Mo. 1963); Aktiebolaget Vargos v. Clark, 8 F.R.D.
635, 636 (D.D.C. 1949).
92. E.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 30 F.R.D. 358, 362 (D.R.I.
1962) (semble); United States v. Loew's Inc., 23 F.R.D. 178, 180 (S.D.
N.Y. 1959) (disclosure of all persons having knowledge, instead of just
trial witnesses, would be very burdensome and might intrude on informers' privilege). The first draft of the amendments eventually proposed in 1955 would have amended Rule 33 to allow discovery of the
names of trial witnesses. See 3 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 16.01[4];
Commentary, Discovery of Names of Trial Witnesses, 21 FED. RULES
SERV. 861 (1955).
93. E.g., Griffin v. Memphis Sales & Mfg. Co., 38 F.R.D. 54, 56
(N.D. Miss. 1965); Cogdill v. TVA, 7 F.R.D. 411, 415 (E.D. Tenn. 1947);

Coca-Cola Co. v. Dixi-Cola Labs., Inc., 30 F. Supp. 275, 280 (D. Md. 1939).

94. E.g., McNamara v. Erschen, 8 F.R.D. 427, 429 (D. Del. 1948).
95. Kyker v. Malone Freight Lines, Inc., 17 F.R.D. 393, 395 (E.D.
Tenn. 1955).
96. E.g., United States v. 216 Bottles, 36 F.R.D. 695, 701 (E.D.N.Y.
1965); Kling v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel., 9 F.R.D. 604 (S.D. Fla. 1949).
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question whether any advantage results. A number of courts
have denied discovery on the ground that pretrial conference
procedures are better adapted to disclosure of trial witnesses."
Given the advantage of timing disclosure immediately before
trial, and given the great likelihood that pretrial procedures
will be used in suits of such potential complication that advance
notice of trial witnesses is likely to be useful, there is no real
reason why discovery should be available as a duplicate procedure.9 8 In the final analysis, identification of trial witnesses
on discovery does not seem to involve any of the considerations
underlying the work product doctrine.9 9 The problem seems to
be largely one of the relative convenience of discovery and pretrial procedures; probably the best resolution would be to allow
discovery shortly before trial in any case in which formal pretrial procedures are not employed.
Undoubtedly there are further examples of discovery efforts
which, if successful, would invade areas which should remain
sacred. 10 0 The examples just explored, however, should suffice
97.

E.g., Wirtz v. Continental Fin. & Loan Co., 326 F.2d 561, 564

(5th Cir. 1964); Wirtz v. B.A.C. Steel Prods., Inc., 312 F.2d 14, 16 (4th
Cir. 1962); Truck Drivers Local 696 v. Grosshans & Petersen, Inc., 209
F. Supp. 161 (D. Kan. 1962); United States v. Procter & Gamble Co.,
25 F.R.D. 252, 255 (D.N.J. 1960).
98. Professor Moore argues that discovery of the identity of trial
witnesses should be allowed to eliminate "surprise witnesses." Pos-

sible adverse effects can be avoided, in his view, by the conditions
that parties would not be bound to call all of the witnesses listed,
should be permitted upon proper notice to call other witnesses, and
should not be required to identify trial witnesses at an early stage of the

26.19 [4]. These qualifications
litigation. 4 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
appear to remove any advantages inherent in discovery as compared
to exchange of witness lists at an attorneys' conference held prior to a
pretrial conference.
99. Impeachment witnesses may deserve special treatment, but any
determination of this question must be made on the basis of considerations going beyond the work product doctrine as such.
100. Cutting across all areas of work product protection are the
conceptually related questions of its applicability when discovery is
sought in a case other than the case for which the material was prepared, and of waiver by revelation to outsiders.
Several cases suggest that the protection applies only if the materials were prepared in anticipation of the very suit before the court,
Gulf Constr. Co. v. St. Joe Paper Co., 24 F.R.D. 411, 415 (S.D. Tex. 1959),
and vanishes when that litigation is terminated. See Hanover Shoe, Inc.
v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 207 F. Supp. 407, 410 (M.D. Pa. 1962);
Tobacco & Allied Stocks v. Transamerica Corp., 16 F.R.D. 534, 537
It should be clear that this conclusion is tenable
(D. Del. 1954).
only when there is no danger of disclosure to others pursuing claims
related to the claims involved in the litigation giving rise to the one-time
work product materials. See, e.g., Republic Gear Co. v. Borg-Warner
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to give the flavor of the area which deserves work product protection. The key concept is that of adversarial strategy, nothing
more. This concept does not extend of its own force to surprise
impeachment materials or the desirability of covering up an
absence of such materials; the proper role of discovery in that
area must be determined on the basis of closely related but
distinct considerations to be explored below.
Justifying limitations on discovery by the need for privacy
in shaping trial tactics entails three further conclusions which
should be noted briefly. First, it is clear that the fact that a
person is engaged as an attorney in pending litigation does not
preclude discovery of his factual knowledge about a case; 1° 1 one
rather loose way of phrasing this conclusion is that protection is
available only for materials developed while the attorney is
acting in a capacity which involves his "professional skill and
experience."'1 ° 2 Second, to whatever extent a party or any other
person participates in shaping trial tactics or theories, work
product protection should be available notwithstanding the absence of professional standing. 10 3
Corp., 381 F.2d 551, 557 (2d Cir. 1967); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v.
Union Carbide Co., 35 F.R.D. 520, 522-23 (D. Colo. 1964) (dictum); Note,
Attorney's Work-Product,Privilege in the Federal Courts, 42 ST. JOHN'S
L. REv. 560, 563 (1968).
1 . Waiver is occasionally found in disclosure of work product materials to third persons not related to the litigation, e.g., D'Ippolito v.
Cities Serv. Co., 39 F.R.D. 610 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), although it is clear that
disclosure to actual or potential co-parties does not constitute waiver.
E.g., Transmirra Prods. Corp. v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 26 F.R.D. 572,
578-79 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). Since the policies behind the protection against
discovery are different from the policies behind the attorney-client
privilege, it should be clear that waiver should not be found except in
clear circumstances of actual intention that an adversary may see the
material involved. E.g., Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass
Co., 275 F. Supp. 146, 148-49 (E.D. Pa. 1967). Compare E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 24 F.R.D. 416, 419 n.3 (D.Del.
1959); 3 J. WEnms=rn, H. KoRN & A. MILLER, NEW YoRx CIVM PRACTICE
3101.45 (rev. ed. 1968).
101. E.g., Smith v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 30 F.R.D. 534, 538-39
(M.D. Tenn. 1962); Shiner v. American Stock Exch., 28 F.R.D. 34

(S.D.N.Y. 1961); McCall v. Overseas Tankship Corp., 16 F.R.D. 467
(S.D.N.Y. 1954); Reiss v. British General Ins. Co., 9 F.R.D. 610 (S.D.N.Y.

1949).

See also Steelman v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 35 F.R.D.

120 (W.D. Mo. 1964) (interrogatories must be addressed to party, whose
answers must include information available to his attorney).
102. E.g., Philadelphia Housing Authority v. American Radiator &
Standard Sanitary Corp., 291 F. Supp. 247, 250 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
103. See Southern Ry. v. Lanham, 403 F.2d 119, 131-32 (5th Cir.
1968) (evaluation of case by claims agent entitled to work product protection); Cleary, Hickman v. Jencks, Jurisprudence of the Adversary
System, 14 VAi-n. L. REv. 865, 867 (1961) (protection of a litigant hand-
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Finally, there is only marginal room for adding an exception
allowing discovery upon a showing of "good cause" to the protection of the hard core of work product. By its very definition,
this concept includes an evaluation of the gains and losses resulting from discovery in most cases, and a conclusion that it
should not ordinarily be allowed. 10 4 The nature of the matters
likely to fall within the protected area, as examined above, suggests that revelation would be appropriate only in cases of
pathological complexity or obscurity, and that it can best be
accomplished in such cases through more or less directly supervised pretrial procedures rather than completely unsupervised
discovery.
Curiously enough, no attempt has been made to embody
this core of the word product doctrine as such in the proposed
Rules amendments. The proposal expressly limits discovery
only of "documents and tangible things," although the protection
is of course equally necessary for intangible impressions and
intentions. Presumably the traditional protection will continue;
otherwise the proposed rule would be too narrow in scope.
Whether the rule is too broad, in extending protection to documents and tangible things which do not reflect the core of trial
preparation, depends primarily on a determination of the proper
scope of discovery of factual information and of witness statements, the questions discussed next below.
B.

FACTUAL INFORMATION

It has been clear from the inception of the work product
doctrine that it does not prevent discovery of factual information
uncovered by an attorney preparing for trial. The Court put
the matter succinctly in Hickman v. Taylor, stating that a party
"clearly cannot refuse to answer interrogatories on the ground
that the information sought is solely within the knowledge of his
ling his own case "would seem to be no less essential to effective
preparation than would be so if a lawyer were employed"); cf. California v. United States, 27 F.R.D. 261, 262 (N.D. Cal. 1961).
104. See, e.g., United States v. Swift & Co., 24 F.R.D. 280, 284
(N.D. Ill. 1959) (ordering production of responses obtained by the Govennent to a questionnaire sent to over 1500 companies; finding small
incursion on any arguably protectible area of trial preparation and
great benefit to trial of a protracted case):
The privilege of the lawyer's work product and the showing of
good cause sufficient to overcome it are interdependent, and
when, as here, the factors supporting the claim of privilege are
weak, the requisite showing of good cause is correspondingly
lessened.
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attorney."'1 5 Discovery of such factual information is, as already noted, inconsistent with attempts to explain the work
product doctrine in terms of a need to discourage reliance upon
the trial preparation efforts of the other side. Occasionally this
inconsistency has led a court to conclude that factual information should not be subject to discovery, 10 6 but the overwhelming majority of decisions have held that facts are freely
discoverable. 107
(1)

Survey Data Preparedfor Litigation

The rule that factual information is not within the sweep
of work product protection has been tested by cases dealing with
discovery of survey data prepared for litigation. Recent cases
have ruled that work product protection extends to the contents
of, and responses to, questionnaires addressed by the Government to members of an industry affected by an antitrust suit. 08
Little explanation is offered for this result beyond a general
declaration that such matters clearly represent trial preparation
materials prepared under the direction of an attorney, although
it has been suggested that at least the questionnaires deserve
protection because the questions themselves might tend to reveal the lawyer's legal theories. 0 9 This theory is impliedly
supported by decisions ruling that answers to questions already
105. 329 U.S. 495, 504 (1947).
106. E.g., Kagan v. Langer Trans. Corp., 43 F.R.D. 404 (S.D.N.Y.
1967).
107. E.g., Cedolia v. C.S. Hill Saw Mills, Inc., 41 F.R.D. 524, 527
(M.D.N.C. 1967); Steelman v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 35 F.R.D.
120 (W.D. Mo. 1964). Factual information developed by experts for
trial use has been brought within this rule as well. E.g., E.I. du Pont
de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 24 F.R.D. 416, 421 (D. Del.
1959); United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 15 F.R.D. 224, 236
(S.D. Cal. 1953); cf. Clevite Corp. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 257
F. Supp. 50 (S.D. Cal. 1966). The proposed amendments to the discovery rules make it clear that the work product doctrine does not
extend to factual information, as in the comment of the Advisory
Committee that:
no change is made in the existing doctrine . . . that one party
may discover relevant facts known or available to the other
party, even though such facts are contained in a document
which is itself not discoverable.
PRELiMNARY DRAFT 26. The Columbia Report indicates that discovery
of an opponent's factual contentions is the second most frequently
sought goal of discovery. COLUmBiA REPORT III. 36. See also id. at II.
3; I1. 26, 40; IV. 15.
108. United States v. American Optical Co., 37 F.R.D. 233 (E.D. Wis.
1965); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 34 F.R.D. 241, 243 (E.D.
Mo. 1963).
109. See Note, supra note 100, at 564-65.
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made available to the discovering party should be discoverable
because they do not involve any peculiarly legal contribution by
the attorney who prepared the questions." 0 A more realistic
line was drawn in another case, however, where the plaintiff in
a trademark infringement action was ordered to provide full
information concerning a consumer confusion survey, including
the methods of selecting the persons interviewed and the questions asked and statements made to them, but excluding the
instructions given by counsel to the interrogators which did not
relate to the actual conduct of the survey."' Since the legal
theories and specific contentions of a party are freely discoverable in any event, there does not appear to be any sound
reason why such factual information should be protected. The
difficulty of on-the-spot evaluation and refutation of survey
methods during trial, indeed, suggests that the case for discovery
is stronger than with many simpler types of factual information." 2
(2)

Supplemental Answers

The extent of the obligation to reveal factual information
secured during the course of trial preparation is underscored by
the proposed provisions defining the duty to supplement answers
to prior discovery efforts with information acquired after the
original answers have been framed. Proposed Rule 26(e) provides that later-acquired information must be provided whenever it relates to the identity of persons having knowledge of
the facts in suit or the identity of expert witnesses, or whenever
it is learned that answers previously given are incorrect. Other110. Ledge Hills Farms, Inc. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 7 FED. RULES
SERV. 2D 34.411, Case 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); United States v. Swift & Co.,

24 F.R.D. 280, 282-84 (N.D. Ill. 1959). A contrary result was reached
in United States v. Deere & Co., 9 F.R.D. 523 (D. Minn. 1949), partly on
the ground that the persons answering the questionnaire should be
protected by an informer's privilege, and partly on the ground that the
answers are as much a part of work product as if they had been individually formulated as witness statements to counsel.
111. Seven-Up Co. v. Get U Corp., 30 F.R.D. 550 (N.D. Ohio 1962).
The court's unfavorable reaction to the survey as trial evidence is recorded in 137 U.S.P.Q. 871, 878-81 (N.D. Ohio 1963), aff'd per curiam,
340 F.2d 954 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 901 (1965).
112. There is no sound reason to find that responses to surveys
should be protected in the same way that ordinary witness statements
are. Quite aside from the argument advanced below that witness
statements themselves should be freely discoverable, it is well settled
that the factual information contained in witness statements is discoverable, even though the statements are not subject to production.
E.g., Hazell v. Pennsylvania R.R., 15 F.R.D. 282, 284 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
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wise, the duty to supplement answers arises only when ordered
by the court, when created by agreement, or when the inquiring
party specifically requests supplementation.
This proposal seems a satisfactory response to a problem
which has been treated in various ways by different courts, 113
if only to achieve an answer to a question which demands a
clear rule.114 It requires the interrogating party to identify the
areas of inquiry in which he feels there is need for updated
information, but provides insurance against ignorance of serious
proportions by requiring the interrogated party to provide information in categories which are easily identifiable and obviously important. An unqualified obligation to provide all
new information as acquired might accomplish more completely
mutual knowledge of all the facts, but the resulting burden of
constantly reviewing and supplementing previous answers
would far exceed the marginal benefit obtained.
The interaction between fact discovery and protection of
trial preparation efforts is found in two further areas which
are not touched by the proposed amendments. The first involves efforts to shortcut the discovery process by simply asking
for all the facts in the opponent's possession relating to the case
or to specified aspects of it; the second involves the nature of
113. Some decisions have announced a duty substantially the same
as the proposed Rule. See Diversified Prods. Corp. v. Sports Center
Co., 42 F.R.D. 3 (D. Md. 1967); Gorsha v. Commercial Transport Corp.,
38 F.R.D. 188 (E.D. La. 1965). The highly similar provisions of Local
Rule 20 (f), E.D. Pa., are discussed and applied in Chisholm v. Board
of Pub. Educ., 33 F.R.D. 313 (E.D. Pa. 1963); Frankel v. Stake, 33 F.R.D.
1 (E.D. Pa. 1963); Taggart v. Vermont Trans. Co., 32 F.R.D. 587 (E.D.
Pa. 1963), af-'d per curiam, 325 F.2d 1022 (3d Cir. 1964). Other courts
have found a continuing duty to provide additional information if it is
requested on an interrogatory-by-interrogatory basis, Novick v. Pennsylvania R.R., 18 F.R.D. 296 (W.D. Pa. 1955); have imposed a specific
duty to provide additional information in individual orders, Chenault
v. Nebraska Farm Prods., Inc., 9 F.R.D. 529, 533 (D. Nebr. 1949); have
upheld answers stating a lack of information on condition that the
information be provided when acquired, Wedding v. Tallant Transfer
Co., 37 F.R.D. 8, 11 (N.D. Ohio 1963); or have found a general duty to
supply current information in the spirit of the discovery rules, Montecatini Edison v. Rexall Drug & Chem. Co., 288 F. Supp. 486, 491 (D.
Del. 1968); Lunn v. United Aircraft Corp., 25 F.R.D. 186, 189-90 (D. Del.
1960). Other courts have ruled that continuing interrogatories may not
be used. E.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. King, 45 F.R.D. 521
(W.D. Okla. 1968). See generally Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Miller,
402 F.2d 134, 142-45 (8th Cir. 1968).
114. The Advisory Committee notes that "it is essential that the
rules provide an answer to this question. The parties can adjust to a
rule either way, once they know what it is." PRIMxnvnARY DRAT 36.
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the duty to answer factual inquiries when conflicting information is available.
(3)

GeneralInquiries

The broadest form of factual inquiry to receive judicial
approval is a request for "all the facts relating to the alleged
accident." This interrogatory was a form worked out in conference between the court and several active trial lawyers "in an
effort to eliminate the necessity for the mass of minutely detailed interrogatories which had become customary."1 1 5 Two
subsequent decisions in the same court, however, have found
an interrogatory seeking all information relating to an accident
to be too broad, although the more recent opinion indicates
that a request for information regarding the facts of the accident, instead of all information relevant to the accident, would
be approved. 10 Another court has recently disapproved earlier
opinions" 17 finding requests for "all the facts" objectionable because of the impossibility of judicial supervision of the completeness of the answers; it allowed a series of requests for a
statement of all the facts known to the interrogated party which
8
supported individually specified contentions advanced by him.1
At first blush it might seem that such interrogatories represent the ultimate form of invasion into an opponent's trial
preparations, requiring him to marshal all available information
and categorize it according to his view of the issues, thereby
revealing in advance the complete details of his trial strategy.
Beyond this objection, there is also a danger that available
arguments might be overlooked in categorizing the facts during
discovery, and might accordingly be shut off at trial for want
of advance disclosure.
Closer examination, however, reveals that these cases simply
involve a particular form of the general request, examined above,
for a statement of the facts which will be relied upon to support
particular contentions. Any such request seeks a statement of
115. Gaynor v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 8 F.R.D. 302, 302-03 n.1
(E.D. Pa. 1948). See also Speck, The Practical Operation of Federal
Discovery, 12 F.R.D. 131, 132, 134 (1952).
116. Mort v. A/S D/S Svendborg, 41 F.R.D. 225, 226 (E.D. Pa. 1966);
Pankola v. Texaco, Inc., 25 F.R.D. 184 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
117. Stovall v. Gulf & South Am. S.S. Co., 30 F.R.D. 152, 154 (S.D.
Tex. 1961); Sheffield Corp. v. George P. Alger Co., 16 F.R.D. 27, 29
(S.D. Ohio 1954).
118. Rheem Mfg. Co. v. Strato Tool Corp., 276 F. Supp. 1005 (D.N.J.
1967). See also Microtron Corp. v. Minnesota Min. & Mfg. Co., 269 F.
Supp. 22 (D.N.J. 1967).
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all the facts currently available, and could not honestly be answered by a statement of only some of the facts. The dividing
line between the proper and improper therefore appears to be
the line already suggested: a single unfocused inquiry for "all
the facts" is improper, as is a request for a formal statement of
evidence which will be offered at trial; 119 specific requests for a
statement of the facts which will be relied upon to support
identified contentions are proper.
(4)

Conflicting Information

Somewhat different ties bind contention discovery to a separate problem of fact discovery not treated by the proposed
amendments. A party requested to respond to simple fact discovery, or to state the facts which will be relied upon to support
identified contentions, may be aware of conflicting versions
of the facts, or may not wish to credit the single version available
to him. A common response in such a situation is that discovery questions cannot be answered for want of knowledge of
the true facts. A few cases, however, present the opposite spectacle of a party who simply answers on the basis of the favorable information without indicating that conflicting information
is available. It seems likely that this latter reaction is not an
uncommon litigational reflex, but is seldom reflected in reported
decisions because it is difficult to uncover the nature of the response, particularly in time to get any meaningful relief.
One possible approach to this problem of credibility would
be to allow the party to answer that the facts are uncertain and
must await resolution at trial.1 20 This approach might be supported by the argument that it would be a gross invasion of
work product to require counsel to reveal his evaluation of witness credibility, and that neither counsel nor parties should be
required to perform the ultimate fact-finding function of deter72,768 (S.D.
119. See Bowen v. The News, 1969 CCH TRADE CASES
N.Y. Apr. 11, 1969).
120. See Note, Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 HARv. L.
REv. 940, 1034-35 (1961):
[I]f the issue is legitimately disputed, an answer to a critical
question need rarely be so specific as to prejudice the answering
[I]t would not be reasonable to require the
party's case ....
answering party to resolve conflicts in testimony, weigh the
credibility of witnesses, or in any way assess conflicting or incomplete evidence.

Cf. Note, The Scope of Discovery Under Rule 33, 15 S.C.L. REV. 677, 690

(1963). Another solution is simply to rule that there need be no
answer at all. E.g., Reynolds v. Southern Ry., 4 F.R.D. 526, 528 (N.D.
Ga. 1968).
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mining which witness to believe. Acceptance of this approach,
on the other hand, would close discovery off from much of the
area opened up by allowing discovery of facts uncovered in preparation for trial. More important, the supposed difficulties are
illusional: There is no need for counsel to evaluate credibility,
nor choose between conflicting sources of information, since he
can simply state the nature of conflicting information. Unilateral ignorance of important material is so much at odds with
the basic purposes of discovery that most courts 12 1 have accordingly chosen this alternative.
An early opinion requiring that conflicting information be
set out found this practice would achieve the advantage of
enabling the inquiring party to determine what areas need
further investigation and proof. 122 Several other opinions imposing a duty to set out conflicting information have made it
clear that the answering party may set out the sources or the
nature of its information (e.g., hearsay) in order to avoid being
bound by its response as an admission of fact. 123 Further protection against the dread dangers of preclusion has been provided by allowing an answering party to state expressly that
further information may become available; or to answer in
terms of belief rather than knowledge; 24 or even to answer
by reference to testimony of interested witnesses which the
answering party accepts as establishing circumstances from
be inferred, but rejects as incredible
which wrongful intent can
1 25
in claiming proper intent.
121. But see Bechak v. Conemaugh & B.L.R.R., 18 F.R.D. 147 (E.D.
Pa. 1955) (defendant need not state activities of the plaintiff's fellow
workers at the time of the accident because an answer would oblige
the defendant to accept as true facts unsworn statements of others, or
even to elect which of differing statements to believe); Muth v. Fleming, 7 F.R.D. 537, 538 (W.D. Mo. 1948) ("plaintiffs were warranted in
declining to answer the interrogatories with respect to matters concerning which they had only hearsay information"). Since more recent decisions would require the interrogated party to state his contentions with respect to such matters if asked to do so, any residual effect
these decisions might have is at best small.
122. Taylor v. Sound S.S. Lines, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 388, 389 (D.
Conn. 1951).
123. See, e.g., Riley v. United Air Lines, Inc., 32 F.R.D. 230, 233
(S.D.N.Y. 1962); Cozier v. American Airlines, Inc., 25 F.R.D. 268, 269
(S.D.N.Y. 1960); Hornung v. Eastern Auto. Forwarding Co., 11 F.R.D. 300,
301 (N.D. Ohio 1951).
124. F. & M. Skirt Co. v. A. Wimpfheimer & Bros., 25 F. Supp. 898,
900 (D. Mass. 1939); Sunday v. Gas Serv. Co., 10 F.R.D. 185 (W.D. Mo.
1950); cf. Nagler v. Admiral Corp., 167 F. Supp. 413, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
125. Sahley v. Tipton Co., 40 F.R.D. 495, 496 (D. Del. 1966) (suit to
set aside fraudulent transfers of money and property).
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Similarly, in response to an objection that a request for a
party's version of the accident in suit is too broad, it has been
ruled that if several versions are available it is the answering
party's duty "to tell each and every version.' 126 If only one
version is available, on the other hand, the answer may be
qualified by a caveat that it is based on something other than
127
direct knowledge in order to avoid a binding admission.
Likewise, where a party has responded that its contentions are
based on information and belief, it has been ordered that the
information relied upon be furnished. 128 But if no information
whatever is available to support a specific contention as to the
facts, the answering party cannot be forced to state a specific
contention, provided that it could not reasonably acquire infor29
mation upon which to frame an answer.
Turning to the problem presented by a party who bases an
answer on favorable information despite knowledge of conflicting information, it has been ruled that conflicting information
must be provided even though there is no specific request for
it. 130 This approach seems sound in theory, since it reflects
the basic purpose of discovery to obtain available factual information in addition to disputatious contentions, and since the
existence of conflicting information can be indicated accurately
without trenching at all on the rule that the substance of
identified witness statements is subject to the same protection
as the statements themselves. The fact that the duty to identify
all persons known to have knowledge of any discoverable matter
should enable the inquiring party to uncover the conflicting
versions on his own-assuming that such persons are still available, willing to talk, and able to remember-does not provide
a completely satisfactory alternative because an incomplete inHazell v. Pennsylvania R.R., 15 F.R.D. 282, 284 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
127. Coyne v. Monongahela Connecting R.R., 24 F.R.D. 37 (W.D.
126.

Pa. 1959).

128. Tinker & Rasor v. Pipeline Inspection Co., 16 F.R.D. 465, 467
(W.D. Mo. 1954).
129. United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information
Center, 2 FED. RuLEs SERV. 2D 33.353, Case 3, at 546-47 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
In some circumstances, at least, a court may require a plaintiff to state
what efforts have been made to obtain information, see Breeland v.
Bethlehem Steel Co., 179 F. Supp. 464, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), or may impose a duty to acquire information from closely related sources, see
Firemen's Mut. Ins. Co. v. Erie-Lackawanna R.R., 35 F.R.D. 297, 299
(N.D. Ohio 1964) (insurer must get information known to its insured
in suit brought as subrogee to insured's claim against defendant);
cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 33.
130.

Stom v. Pennsylvania R.R., 15 F.R.D. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
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vestigation may result from lack of resources or diligence, absent notice that it may be fruitful. And the basically proper
attitude of most litigators that nothing should be volunteered
beyond the minimum necessary for strict compliance with the
discovery requested, does not justify the undoubtedly common
attitude that the existence of conflicting information is a proprietary secret which may be concealed unless objections to direct requests for it are unsuccessful.
Difficulties in framing appropriate sanctions, however, may
mean that a duty of disclosure can be effective only to the extent
that good adversarial conscience becomes imbued with the full
spirit of good discovery. In the case cited above, for example,
the court refused to enter judgment for the plaintiff on the
ground of failure to provide the conflicting information. Another court has ruled that answers to interrogatories inconsistent
with the deposition testimony of a party's own agent do not
even establish good cause for production of materials used in
preparing the answers to uncover the possible existence of
varying versions of the facts. 131 The possibility of precluding
the answering party from maintaining his asserted position by
applying the sanctions of Rule 37(d) for failure to respond to
discovery seems somewhat extreme, except in cases of obvious
bad faith. Nonetheless, recognition of the duty to indicate the
existence of conflicting information may in the long run be
substantially self-enforcing.
(5) Summary
Any attempt to gather together these tangled threads of
decisional developments surrounding the relationship between
fact discovery and work product protection is attended by the
dangers usually encountered in relying on reported trial court
decisions as evidence of the tremendous body of evolving and
often divergent practice. It is clear beyond peradventure that
the qualification of strictly adversary litigation inherent in modern discovery has been found to require disclosure of all factual
information, whether or not it was obtained solely by an attorney
preparing for trial. The duty to provide a statement of the
facts which will be relied upon to support identified contentions is probably supported by a duty to indicate the existence
of conflicting information, and, where contentions are requested
or where the answering party chooses not to believe available
131 Cairns v. Chicago Express, Inc., 25 F.R.D. 169 (N.D. Ohio 1960).
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but non-conflicting information, by a duty to indicate the version contended for. As a result, work product protection is
limited to the hard-core area of trial strategy examined above,
and, perhaps, to the area of impeachment materials which still
remains to be examined.
C.

IMPEACHMENT MATERIAL AND WITNESS STATEMENTS

Discovery of documents sought for purposes of impeachment
was denied in one case with the observation that although the
issue of credibility may control the disposition of a lawsuit, it
"is not necessarily relevant to the subject matter." 3 2 The
concession of the importance of credibility carries with it the
refutation of this approach to the problems posed by discovery
of impeachment materials. These problems are approached in
an overwhelming majority of cases from the premise that impeachment matters are within the general scope of discovery, 133
unless special reasons for protection appear.
The most frequently urged reason for protecting impeachment materials from discovery is the fear of perjury, a fear
which in the past gave rise to much of the opposition to creation
of the modern methods of discovery, 34 and which is still prominently expressed in discussions about extending civil discovery
devices to generalized use in criminal proceedings. 135 The argu132. Wharton v. Lybrand, Ross Bros. & Montgomery, 41 F.R.D. 177,
179 (E.D.N.Y. 1966).
133. In addition to the cases discussed below, see Lecklikner v.
Transandina Compania Naviera, 41 F.R.D. 546 (E.D. Pa. 1966), ruling

*that it is proper for a third-party defendant to depose a plaintiff, who
had already been deposed by the defendant, simply for the purpose of
obtaining contradictory statements from the plaintiff.
134. Cf. G. RAGLAND, DiscovERY BEFORE TRiAL 124-26 (1932), recounting the results of "field investigations" in several jurisdictions enjoying broad pretrial discovery. The judges and lawyers interviewed
were asked whether advance knowledge of testimony led to perjured
testimony. "The uniform answer was that ... on the contrary a chief
use of the procedure was to curb perjured testimony and to eliminate
false claims."
135. A frequently cited pair of opposing statements on the dangers
of facilitating perjury by allowing criminal discovery is found in State
,v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881 (1953), opinion on appeal after remand,
17 N.J. 100, 110 A.2d 99 (1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 907 (1955).
Speaking for the majority, Chief Justice Vanderbilt urged that "[ijn
criminal proceedings long experience has taught the courts that often
discovery will lead . . . to perjury and the suppression of evidence."
13 N.J. 203, 210, 98 A.2d 881, 884 (1954). Justice William J. Brennan,
Jr., responded in dissent:
That old hobgoblin perjury, invariably raised with every suggested change in procedure . . . is again disinterred from the
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ment runs basically as follows: if the unscrupulous litigant
does not know how much the scrupulous litigant ("our side" to
all the writers) knows, he will be compelled to stick close to
the truth for fear of being shown up as a liar. As soon as he
learns the extent of his opponent's information, however, he
can lie without inhibition if his opponent knows little or nothing,
and he can devise ways to lie around whatever his opponent
188
does know.
Concern about fabricated testimony provides a strong foundation for limiting discovery to protect values closely akin tobut distinct from-the values protected by the hard-core work
product doctrine. Whether or not there is substance in the
cynical view that a willful perjurer is the most effective witness, it does not seem likely that a substantial proportion of witnesses consciously fabricate and deliver testimony which they
know to be untrue.3 7 Genuine problems are frequently encountered, however, with the natural human tendency to remember facts which are helpful to oneself or one's employer,
friends, or other sympathetic persons. Self-reinforced conviction
undoubtedly is responsible for a considerable amount of sincere
testimony, honestly believed, which lacks any foundation whatever in even mistaken observation. 38 The operation of this
capacity is probably less directly influenced by knowledge of
the extent of an opponent's information than is the development of conscious perjury, but it seems certain that benefits
would result from affording protection to information which
grave where I had thought it was forever buried under the
overwhelming weight of the complete rebuttal supplied by our
experience in civil causes....
Id. at 227, 98 A.2d at 894. See also United States v. Projansky, 44
F.R.D. 550, 555-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Discovery in Criminal Cases, 44
F.R.D. 481, 484-86, 499, 509 (1967); Discovery in Federal Criminal Cases,
33 F.R.D. 47, 62-63, 80, 85, 90-91 (1963); Louisell, Criminal Discovery:
Dilemma Real or Apparent? 49 CAIF. L. REv. 56, 98-101 (1961).
136. See, e.g., Kane, The Work-Product Doctrine-Cornerstone of
the Adversary System, 31 INs. CouNs. J. 130, 133 (1964).
137. See, e.g., Sunderland, Scope and Method of Discovery Before
Trial, 42 YALE L.J. 863, 867 (1933): "Perjury is one of the great bugaboos of the law." Compare Judge Frank's observation in Hoffman v.
Palmer, 129 F.2d 976, 997 (2d Cir. 1942), affd, 318 U.S. 109 (1943):
We hear some ...

complaining that the new Federal Rules...

with their hospitality to pretrial discovery, have engendered
fraud and perjury. The answer is that no one knows. Unfortunately, there were perjury and coaching of witnesses in
the old days; no data is available to show whether those evils
have waxed or waned in these newer days.
Compare 6 J. WIGMOmFE EViDENCE § 1845 (3d ed. 1940).
138. See, e.g., Prettyman, The Spririt of the Rules, 28 F.R.D. 51,
58-59 (1960).
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bears on witness credibility.
Evaluations of the benefits resulting from enforced ignorance of the extent of an opponent's impeaching information
vary greatly. Federal trial judges have voiced the view that
the gains in reducing "conforming" testimony or deliberate
fabrications are generally outweighed by the dangers of surprise trial use. 139 Writers in insurance law journals, on the
other hand, frequently and vigorously champion the contrary
view that discovery of impeachment material will "destroy the
very strength" of the adversary system, and will "simply aid
the fraudulent and frustrate justice." 149 The challenge thus
posed is really a manifold one, involving different types of impeachment material, and bears examination in relation to each
type unless supervening arguments based on the work product
doctrine require a conclusion of nondiscoverability in any event.
Such supervening arguments might be thought to lie in the
basic case for protecting hard core work product. Impeachment
material represents the most easily rationalized instance of the
successful use of surprise as a tool of adversary fact presentation,
so the values of secrecy may be thought to be merely a particular
extension of a generalized policy. Moreover, such material as
is available has almost certainly been gathered by investigations
undertaken in preparation for trial, and its discovery can add
only knowledge of projected trial tactics, since underlying
factual contentions and information are subject to discovery in
any event. Protection of such material, including protection
against disclosure of the fact there is no such material, might
thus seem to follow as a matter of course. When the question
is broken down into the various categories of impeachment material, however, little if any basis appears for protection independent of the peculiar values of secrecy arising from the na14 1
ture of impeachment itself.
139. E.g., Bard, The Practical Operation of Federal Discovery, 12
F.R.D. 131, 152, 156 (1952); Holtzoff, The Elimination of Surprise in

FederalPractice, 7 VAND L. REV. 576, 578-79 (1954).
140. Watson, The Settlement Theory of Discovery, 55 ILL. B.J. 480,
489 (1967). See also Berman, Pre-Trial: Utility or Futility, 32 INs.
CouNs. J. 602, 607, 609 (1965); Griffin, Discovery: A Criticism of the
Practice, 1 Foru= 11, 20-21 (July, 1966); Hawkins & Hinshaw, Report
on Rules 33, 34 and 36, 13 INs. CouNs. J. 23, 24 (1946); Knepper, Some
Suggestions for Limiting Discovery, 34 LNs. CouNs. J. 398, 403-04 (1967).
141. The relationship between the work product doctrine and limitations on discovery of impeachment material is not elucidated by the
comments of the Advisory Committee to the proposed rule amendments.
Its main comment is that, "courts have in appropriate circumstances
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Federal decisions in this area may be divided into three
major categories, involving impeachment by use of various types
of factual information; by use of facts which if true must be
known to the inquiring party; and by prior inconsistent statements. Quite different considerations apply to discovery in each
of these three categories.
(1)

FactualInformation Unknown to InquiringParty

Factual information useful for impeachment but not of
such a character that the facts sought must, if true, be known
to the inquiring party, has uniformly been found discoverable.
The most frequently occurring example is a request for information about criminal convictions of a plaintiff, useful for impeaching his credibility as a witness. 142 Questions designed to
uncover the financial stake other witnesses may have in the
litigation have also been allowed, such as a request for the
names of persons sharing the costs of suit, 1 43 a request for
information whether an expert medical witness first examined
a personal injuries plaintiff in litigation-oriented circumstances, 144 or an inquiry whether one party contends that an
agent of the other has offered to pay witnesses for their testimony. 14
Perhaps the most unusual ruling required a partydeponent to answer questions as to his reasons for invoking
the fifth amendment before the House Committee on Un-American Activities several years earlier, partly on the grounds that
if criminal activities were uncovered they could be useful for
impeachment purposes, and that if the privilege had been
asserted without justification that fact too could have an im46
pact on present credibility.

protected materials that are primarily of an impeaching character."

18, 23.
142. E.g., Eaddy v. Little, 235 F. Supp. 1021 (E.D.S.C. 1964); Wedding v. Tallant Transfer Co., 37 F.R.D. 8, 9 (N.D. Ohio 1963); Meadows
v. Palmer, 33 F.R.D. 136, 137 (D.Md. 1963); Taylor v. Atchison, T. & S.F.
Ry., 33 F.R.D. 283, 285 (W.D. Mo. 1962).
143. Uinta Oil Ref. Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 226 F. Supp. 495,
PRELIMINARY DRAFT

500 (D. Utah 1964).

144. McNenar v. New York, Chi. & St. L. R.R., 20 F.R.D. 598 (W.D.
Pa. 1957). The court further ruled, however, that the expert could not
be asked how many litigants he had examined for purposes of testifying, and how many times he had actually testified, both for the attorney for the present plaintiff and for other attorneys. Such matter
was found to lie beyond the realm of legitimate impeachment.
145. B. & S. Drilling Co. v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co.,
24 F.R.D. 1, 5 (S.D. Tex. 1959).
146. Independent Prods. Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 22 F.R.D. 266, 273
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None of the possible reasons for limiting discovery of impeachment material apply in such cases. There is no problem
of interference with trial preparation efforts, no danger of destroying the truth-revealing impact of strategic surprise, and good
reason to believe that in most cases the information sought cannot be uncovered in other ways.
(2)

InformationWhich Must Be Known to the InquiringParty

Greater difficulties are presented by a demand for information which-provided it is true-necessarily must be known
to the inquiring party. This problem ordinarily arises when a
plaintiff in a personal injuries suit seeks to learn what information the defendant has about the plaintiff's physical condition prior to the events in suit; a typical pair of interrogatories
might read:
Did plaintiff ever suffer any injuries, sickness, disease or
abnormality of any kind prior to the accident alleged in this
action involving any part or function of the body claimed in
this suit to have been injured; If so, when?
What was the said
47
injury, sickness, disease or abnormality?1
However appropriate it might seem for a defendant to put
such an inquiry to the plaintiff, there is an immediate suspicious reaction when the plaintiff puts it to the defendant.
The competing considerations bearing on discoverability are
readily apparent. On the one hand, concealment of the defendant's knowledge may have a powerful effect on the veracity
of the plaintiff's testimony, discovery will probably add nothing
to identification of the issues to be tried, and any available information must certainly have been gathered in anticipation of litigation. On the other hand, it would be difficult to establish that
impeachment material is intrinsically more trustworthy than
any other kind of evidence, 148 and advance knowledge may be
(S.D.N.Y. 1958) (it was further found that there existed no present
danger of incrimination).
147. These interrogatories, taken from Mort v. A/S D/S Svendborg, 41 F.R.D. 225, 226 (E.D. Pa. 1966), are questions 48 and 49 of the
set of interrogatories approved for asking in appropriate cases by
the Judges of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, FED. R. SERv. LOcAL
COURT RULES, Pa. 20-26.
148. Compare the observation of Vice Chief Justice Struckmeyer,
dissenting from the allowance of discovery of surveillance information,
in Zimmerman v. Superior Court, 98 Ariz. 85, 96 n.2, 402 P.2d 212, 219
n.2 (1965):
The argument is made that not to disclose leaves the plaintiff
open to manufactured or perjured testimony from the defendant's witnesses. I think this is highly unrealistic and implausible. I, personally, know of no instance in thirty years as an
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the only effective way of enabling explanation or refutation.
Beyond this consideration, a great deal of evidence has value
both for substantive and impeachment purposes-revelation
that the plaintiff had long suffered from the condition now
attributed to the defendant's fault, for instance, serves not only
to discredit the plaintiff's contrary testimony but also to bolster
the defense that the defendant did not cause the condition.
Federal courts have responded to this dilemma in several
reported decisions by denying discovery. In sustaining objections to the interrogatories set out above, for instance, the court
observed that the plaintiff would be given full opportunity to
explain at trial any innocent lapses of memory as to his own
prior condition, and found the object of the interrogatories was
not to discover facts, "but instead to frustrate an effective crossexamination and to avoid the possibility of impeachment."' 149
Other decisions similarly deny discovery of the information available to the defendant, but require the defendant to state whether
it will be contended that the plaintiff's claimed injuries are due in
whole or in part to other events. 15 0
The intimately related question whether a plaintiff may discover the existence, and perhaps the contents, of "surveillance"
movies designed to show the exaggeration of claimed disabilities
has been answered in the negative by one court. 151 Other federal judges, however, require a pretrial showing of such movies
in order to enable the opposing party to prepare to meet anything which is open to further explanation. 52 It seems clear,
attorney in which it has been asserted that a defendant manufactured surveillance evidence.
Wigmore, on the other hand, observed that in determining whether
particular information should be subject to pretrial disclosure,
[i]t is not easy, by any analysis or classification, by experience
or by deduction, to enumerate, and to say that this or that
class of evidence is in general attended by the feasibility of
falsification, while another is not.
6 J. WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 1845, at 373 (3d ed. 1940).
149. Mort v. A/S D/S Svendborg, 41 F.R.D. 225, 227 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
150. E.g., Knighton v. Villian & Fassio, 39 F.R.D. 11, 13-14 (D.Md.
1965); Buining v. The Transporter, 171 F. Supp. 127, 135-36 (D.Md.
1959); Stone v. Marine Transp. Lines, Inc., 23 F.R.D. 222, 226 (D. Md.
1959). See also Coyne v. Monongahela Connecting R.R., 24 F.R.D. 357
(W.D. Pa. 1959).
151. Hikel v. Abousy, 41 F.R.D. 152 (D.Md. 1966).
152. See Chandler, Discovery and Pre-Trial Procedure in Federal
Courts, 12 OKLA. L. REV. 321, 324 (1959); Gourley, Effective Pretrial
Must be the Beginning of Trial, 28 F.R.D. 165, 169 (1960). One statement of the case for discovery from the plaintiff's point of view is
Farris, Can Plaintiff Get a Preview of Defendant's Movies, 1959 TRIAL
& TORT TaREs 397, 402-03.
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therefore, that federal trial judges are no more unanimous on
153
this aspect of discovery than on any other.
In some ways, the most satisfactory response to the choice
between the potential advantages and disadvantages of surprise
in this area might be to leave the matter to the discretion of the
trial judge. The tacit assumption underlying this decision would
be that judges are capable of making sufficiently accurate assessments of the probability of misuse, primarily on the basis of the
past experience or reputation of particular counsel, to allow
discovery in most cases in which it would contribute to the overall search for truth. 5 4 Unfortunately, several considerations
make such an approach unsatisfactory. In large districts, the
supposed basis for individualistic judgments would often be
completely lacking. Past experience with particular cases, moreover, might reflect the client's honesty rather than the attorney's-surely there would be little point in allowing discovery
on condition that the material be kept secret from the client.
As the practice developed, judges might become reluctant to
deny discovery for fear of branding counsel as untrustworthy.
Present litigants, finally, may not fairly be asked to pay in unpreparedness for the past transgressions of counsel, even if they
could be known. Nor is there any workable basis for making
rational discretionary judgments other than past experience
with a particular lawyer. A discretionary approach, accordingly,
seems likely to be an arbitrary, hit-or-miss avoidance of the problem rather than its solution.
An alternate approach that has attracted some courts and
commentators has been the suggestion that a party possessing
information relevant for both substantive and impeachment purposes should be allowed to elect whether to use it solely for impeachment purposes. The case most frequently cited for this
position is actually quite obscure. 55 The plaintiff had inquired
153. One of the leading state cases allowing discovery of impeachment material which, if true, must be known to the inquiring party is
Boldt v. Sanders, 261 Minn. 160, 111 N.W.2d 225 (1961).
154. In Margeson v. Boston & Me. R.R., 16 F.R.D. 200, 200-01 (D.
Mass. 1954), Judge Aldrich observed:
Experience indicates . . . that there are facile witnesses whose
interest in "knowing the truth before trial" is prompted primarily by a desire to find the most plausible way to defeat the
truth ....
I shall be more liberal [in allowing discovery]
when the situation indicates, and I am not referring to the personalities involved, that the information obtained will not be
abused, either by counsel taking advantage of his opponent's
industry to save his own, or by opportunistic witnesses.
155. Bogatay v. Montour R.R., 177 F. Supp. 269 (W.D. Pa. 1959).
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whether the defendant had observed "any action or activity
by or on the part of plaintiff."'1 6 In sustaining objection to this
interrogatory, the court noted that it was not yet clear whether
the plaintiff intended to claim his ability to do physical work
was impaired by his injuries, or whether the defendant would
seek to refute such a claim by observing the plaintiff. The
opinion then states that the defendant should choose by the
time of the pretrial conference whether to use any available
surveillance material purely for impeachment purposes, and
upon such an election the material need not be disclosed. Since
it is difficult to imagine any impeaching use for such material
unless the plaintiff's continuing physical condition were in issue,
in which event the material would also have a substantive bearing, the opinion does seem to stand for the propostion that a
party may elect to use material which is useful both for impeachment and substantive purposes solely for impeachment,
and upon that election protect it from discovery or disclosure at
pretrial conference. An element of obscurity remains, however,
in the court's concluding comment that in order to ensure
fairness, any material to be used by the defendant at trial
must be submitted to the court for a determination "whether
the evidence is substantive or impeaching." Other courts have
also adopted this procedure, 157 and it has been advocated by
some writers.158
The major difficulty with this proposal lies in the wild
improbability that any fact-finder could, for instance, actually
confine to impeachment use its consideration of motion pictures
showing a supposedly crippled plaintiff painting a house. Some
help may be provided by the suggestion that this approach be
limited to material which has impeachment as its "overriding"
purpose, 1 9 but it is difficult to imagine just what such material
might be. A more minor difficulty involves the burden which
156. Id.
157. See Leach v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 35 F.R.D. 9, 11 (W.D. Mich.
1964); Ralph v. Harry Zubik Co., 214 F. Supp. 145 (W.D. Pa.), affd per
curiam, 319 F.2d 531 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 931 (1963); Burton
v. Weyerhaeuser Timber Co., 1 F.R.D. 571, 572-73 (D. Ore. 1941). The
procedure of judicial evaluation of a claim that certain material is
useful for impeachment was adopted in Vetter v. Lovett, 44 F.R.D. 465
(W.D. Tex. 1968), but it is not clear whether the court envisaged that
the defendant could elect to protect material by refraining from offering it for substantive purposes at trial.
158. See Comment, Pre-Trial Discovery of Impeachment Evidence:
A Need to Reexamine Arizona's New Rule, 7 ARiz. L. REv. 283 (1966).
159. Frank, Pretrial Conference and Discovery-Disclosure or Surprise?, 514 INs. L.J. 661, 665 (1965).
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might be placed on the courts in making such distinctions between substantive and impeaching evidence in advance of trial.
Given the relatively narrow range of impeachment material as
compared to substantive material in an average case, it may be
that the numerical incidence of requests for rulings would not
be high. Formalization of requests by plaintiffs for such material, however, could easily lead to the ritual adoption of this
technique by defendants in every case in order to obscure the
nonexistence of any impeaching information. In addition, it is
questionable whether an accurate assessment of the probable
trial effects of particular evidence can be made without investing a great deal of time in reviewing the entire case. And
even if such an investment could be made, it seems undesirable
to inject the judge into this sort of strategic determination, both
because his forecast cannot be based on anything more than the
cold discovery and pretrial record, and because his involvement
in adversary strategic considerations is ill-suited to a role which
requires judicial intervention only when the adversaries are
bungling rather badly.
Better results could be obtained by a quite different procedure. The values of surprise could be largely preserved by
providing discovery or pretrial revelation of impeachment material which falls within the present category only at a time
shortly before trial, and only after the party asked about the
existence and nature of such material had been given an opportunity-ordinarily by deposition-to commit the inquiring
party to a final version of the events and claims related to the
impeachment material. This procedure should forestall most
conforming testimony, and would afford a reasonably effective
means of embarrassing those who might still attempt to meet
the impeaching material in untruthful ways. At the same time,
it would be possible to prepare to meet impeaching material
which is susceptible of honest explanation or refutation. Having preserved the values of surprise, there would be no remaining reasons to deny discovery; claims of invading the
mysterious sanctum of work product would have no more remaining force than in the area of any other kind of factual
information uncovered or prepared in anticipation of litigation.
(3)

Witness Statements

The major remaining category of impeachment materialsand the largest body of case law-involves statements taken from
witnesses in anticipation of litigation or actual preparation for
trial. Although production of witness statements even at trial
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would have had at best an insecure foundation in traditional
practice, 10 0 the Court's opinion in Hickman v. Taylor almost
seemed to suggest that pretrial production should be ordered
whenever requested for purposes of impeachment."0 ' It was
soon recognized, however, that such an approach would amount
to a denial of work product protection. The ensuing attempt
to define the appropriate degree of protection has produced
many conflicting decisions, interlaced with some confusion as
to the difference between the showing of simple "good cause"
required to obtain production of any documents under Rule 34,
and the stronger showing of justification required to obtain
production of work product materials. Subject to this warning,
statements obtained in anticipation of litigation by an attorney
62
are generally held to be subject to work product protection.
Perhaps a majority of courts would also accord work product
treatment to statements obtained by an investigating agent acting under the immediate direction of an attorney, 6 3 but would
160.

The common-law privilege of a party to refuse to produce

documents in his possession is traced in 8 J. WIGMOaR, EVInxEcE § 2219

(McNaughton rev. 1961).

More modern cases, generally denying trial

production, are gathered in 4 MooRs, FEDERAL PRccTIE

f

26.23[3];

Cleary, Hickman v. Jencks, Jurisprudence of the Adversary System, 14
VA=. L. REv. 865, 870 (1961); Annot., 73 A.L.R.2d 12, 143-50 (1960).
Perhaps the most thoughtful recent opinion, ordering trial production
of a witness' statement simply on a showing that it existed, is Shaw v.
Wuttke, 28 Wis. 2d 448, 137 N.W.2d 649 (1965).
The best known departure from this rule is found in Jencks v.
United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957), and the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500
(1964). Many administrative agencies have followed the lead of this
statute in allowing discovery of witness statements only following
testimony by the witness at trial. E.g., NLRB Rules & Regulations
29 C.F.R. § 102.118 (1968), as amended, 33 Fed. Reg. 9819 (1968); Star
18,520 (FTC 1968).
Office Supply Co., 3 CCH TRADE REG. RF'.
161. [W]ritten statements and documents might, under certain
circumstances, be admissible in evidence or give clues as to the
existence or location of relevant facts. Or they might be useful
Were profor purposes of impeachment or corroboration ....
duction of written statements . . . to be precluded under such

circumstances, the liberal ideals of the deposition-discovery
portions of the Federal Rules .

.

. would be stripped of much

of their meaning.
329 U.S. at 511-12. Clear notice that this language should not be taken
at face value was provided by the fact that the Court found inappropriate the attempt to secure witness statements in the very case before it.
162.

E.g., 4 MooRs, FEDERAL PUCICE

26.23 [8.-3].

Occasional opin-

ions have indicated that written statements are not within the scope of
work product protection, even though taken by an attorney. E.g., Caruso
v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 196 F. Supp. 675, 676 (E.D.N.Y. 1961);
Scourtes v. Fred W. Albrecht Grocery Co., 15 F.R.D. 55, 58 (N.D. Ohio
1953). These statements are clearly a minority view.
163. E.g., Ownby v. United States, 12 FED. RuLEs SEr. 2D 34.411,
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deny it to statements obtained by employees acting in the regular course of the business of such institutional litigants as railroads and insurance companies, even though a regular practice
of obtaining statements had been set up by counsel in anticipation of predictable litigation. 16 4
Various showings of good cause have been accepted as
grounds for production of witness statements, whether or not
they were protected by the work product doctrine, such as unavailability or hostility of the witness, or loss of memory.16 5
For present purposes, greater importance attaches to cases dealing with production for use by way of trial impeachment. The
accepted rule in this area is that a witness statement may be
obtained from an opposing party only if it can be shown that
there is good reason to believe that it is somehow inconsistent
with other statements by the same witness; it is not enough
simply to request discovery for the purpose of determining
whether such inconsistencies exist.' 6 6 Availability for inspection thus depends on the usually capricious happenstance that
something has by chance occurred to justify a reasonable belief that some discrepancy exists. Discovery has been ordered
when a deponent was advised by counsel not to answer a question whether there were any discrepancies between his depo67
sition testimony and prior written statements made by him;
Case 4 (W.D. Okla. 1968); Kagan v. Langer Trans. Corp., 43 F.R.D. 404,
405 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); cf. Alltmont v. United States, 177 F.2d 971, 976
(3d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 967 (1950).
164. See American Express Warehousing, Ltd. v. Transamerica Ins.
Co., 380 F.2d 277, 284-86 (2d Cir. 1967) (Lumbard, C.J., dissenting);
Southern Ry. v. Campbell, 309 F.2d 569, 572 (5th Cir. 1962); Burke v.

United States, 32 F.R.D. 213 (E.D.N.Y. 1963); 2A
FEDERAL PRACTICE

§ 652.2; 4

MOORE,

BARRON
FEDERAL PRACTICE f

&

HOLTZOFF,

26.23

[8.-1].

Compare Groover, Christie &Merritt v. LoBianco, 336 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir.
1964) (memorandum of witness interviews conducted by a member of
the defendant partnership was not entitled to work product protection);
Southern Ry. v. Campbell, 309 F.2d 569, 572 (5th Cir. 1962).
165. E.g., 4 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
34.08, at 2482-93.
166. The most frequently cited decision is Hauger v. Chicago, R.I.
& Pac. R.R., 216 F.2d 501 (7th Cir. 1954).
Occasionally a contrary
approach is suggested, as in Jarosiewicz v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 21 FED.
RULES SEav. 34.13, Case 5 (E.D. Pa. 1955) where the court found good
cause for production of statements of witnesses who had already been
deposed in the need to give "an opportunity to check the statements of
the witnesses against their testimony." See also Morrone v. Southern
Pac. Co., 7 F.R.D. 214 (S.D. Cal. 1947). Burns v. Mulder, 20 F.R.D. 605,
607 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 1957), shows that the approach taken in the Jarosiewicz case is not yet apt to meet with general approval.

167. Goosman v. A. Duie Pyle, Inc., 320 F.2d 45 (4th Cir. 1963),
opinion on appeal after remand, 336 F.2d 151 (4th Cir. 1964). Compare
Maryland Shipbuilding & Drydock Co. v. Baker-Whitely Towing Co.,
42 F.R.D. 12 (D. Md. 1967).
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when a deponent was unable to state whether his deposition
testimony was in accord with prior written statements because
he was unable to recall significant details of the accident in
question; 168 and when counsel admitted that there were discrepancies between a statement and deposition testimony, and
offered the statement to the court for a determination whether
it should be produced. 109
Examination by the court to determine whether witness
statements are inconsistent with other statements of the same
witness may seem to offer one way around the apparently arbitrary nature of the rule which requires a showing of probable
inconsistency as a condition of inspection.170 Since discovery
may legitimately be directed to the existence rather than the
contents of witness statements, 17' such a procedure might seem
to ensure discovery whenever it would be of any benefit to the
inquiring party. Courts which have used this procedure,
however, are generally not enthusiastic. In one of the cases just
noted the judge stated that discovery should be allowed because of an admission that discrepancies existed, and because
although the statements had been given to him, he did not have
"sufficient knowledge of the facts in this case to determine
whether the discrepancies ... are of such a nature as to affect
the question of liability.' ' 7 2 More pointed criticism was offered
by another court, which suggested that the burden of determining what discrepancies exist could easily become unmanageable and that it is undesirable to transfer the burden of showing
1 73
good cause from litigants to the judge in this fashion.
168. McDonald v. Prowdley, 38 F.R.D. 1, 3 (W.D. Mich. 1965).

169. Fulton v. Swift, 43 F.R.D. 166, 168-69 (D.Mont. 1967).
170. See Vetter v. Lovett, 44 F.R.D. 465 (W.D. Tex. 1968), ordering
the defendant to submit to the court any witness statements he would
not voluntarily turn over to the plaintiff, so that the court might compare such statements with the testimony in any depositions which
might be taken, and turn over to the plaintiff any statements conflicting with the testimony "in any material respect."
171. E.g., Harvey v. Eimco Corp., 28 F.R.D. 380 (E.D. Pa. 1961);
Klop v. United Fruit Co., 18 F.R.D. 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); 4 MooRE, FEDEAL PRAcTicE

26.19[1].

In particular circumstances, a valid informer's

privilege may prevent a requirement that the identity of witnesses providing statements be disclosed. E.g., United States v. Hemphill, 369
F.2d 539 (4th Cir. 1966).
172. Fulton v. Swift, 43 F.R.D. 166, 168-69 (D.Mont. 1967).
173. Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 32 F.R.D. 350, 351-52
(E.D. Pa. 1962). So far as the burden on the court is concerned, it
could be alleviated by adopting the alternate suggestion that discovery
ought to extend to a request for a statement whether witness statements in the possession of a party vary from the deposition or other
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Beyond the difficulties of implementing such a procedure
lies the question whether work product protection should be
available for witness statements at all. A procedure which results in production of witness statements whenever they may
be useful is equivalent to a denial of protection; if this result is
justified, it would be far more direct simply to provide for discovery as a matter of course.
The argument against providing special protection from discovery of witness statements is much the same as the arguments
against providing special protection against discovery of any
other relevant matter. Access to statements of a party's own
witnesses may provide the only meaningful opportunity to recall
legitimately vanished memory, or to prepare to explain apparent discrepancies between former statement and intended testimony.17 4 Access to statements given by an opponent's witness
may prove invaluable in curbing his fancy, and in paving the
way for effective cross-examination. 7 5
Against these obvious benefits, one of the justifications often advanced for extending work product protection to statements prepared by or under the immediate supervision of an
attorney is that his trial strategy can be inferred from the material he has seen fit to include. 1'7 6 In view of the current
statements of the same witnesses, in order to pave the way for a showing of inconsistency justifying discovery of the statements themselves.
See Gardner, Agency Problems in the Law of Attorney-Client Privilege:
Privilege and "Work Product" Under Open Discovery (Part I), 42 U.

DE. L.J. 105, 127, 136-37 (1964). The obvious difficulty with this
suggestion is that a party possessing a statement of his own witness is
not apt to have a refined notion of inconsistency.
174. E.g., Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Show Mach. Corp., 207 F.
Supp. 407 (M.D. Pa. 1962); Sharon Steel Corp. v. Travelers Indem. Co.,
26 F.R.D. 113, 115 (N.D. Ohio 1960).
175. E.g., Richards-Wilcox Mfg. Co. v. Young Spring & Wire Corp.,
34 F.R.D. 212, 213 (N.D. Ill. 1964); Blanchet v. Colonial Trust Co., 23
F.R.D. 118, 120 (D. Del. 1958); Freund, Work Product, 45 F.R.D. 493,
496-97 (1968). The importance of obtaining statements for purposes of
cross-examining witnesses called by the opposing party would justify a
"Jencks" rule for production at trial, if pretrial discovery is not available. Compare the observation of William D. Mitchell, former Chairman of the rules Advisory Committee, that the desirability of discovery
"depends a lot on whether the inquiry is made before the trial, with a
chance to misuse the material, or made after the trial is half through.
." 71 A.B.A. REP. 81, 85 (1946).
The proposed provisions for discovery of expert testimony are
founded squarely on the need to prepare for effective cross-examination. See Rule 26(b) (4), and Advisory Committee Note, PREmuARY
DRAFT 30.

176. This reasoning has prompted some courts to conclude that
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trend to discovery of factual and legal contentions, it seems
unlikely that this consideration is entitled to any weight: intelligent discovery by the other party will have uncovered everything but the fact that it was a particular witness who provided
particular information, 177 and it is always possible that the
witness himself may be willing to divulge that information outside the formal discovery processes. When the scope of the
revelations compelled at a thorough pretrial conference is added
to the balance, 178 along with the possibility of deferring production of the statement to allow protection by prior deposition
of the witness, the force of this argument simply vanishes.
Likewise, for the reasons already discussed, it does not seem
that allowing production as a matter of course would deter
the preparation of written witness statements. 179 It is accordingly difficult to escape the conclusion that the extension of
work product protection can be justified, if at all, only on
grounds inconsistent with the current premise that discovery
should be allowed upon a showing of probable inconsistency between a prior statement and later pronouncements by the same
witness. The only available justification, that is, must be that
use of inconsistent prior statements for impeachment falls
within the area of surprise tactics legitimately employed to improve the fact-revealing processes of adversary litigation. Acceptance of this justification, however, would entail the conclusion that whenever there is a chance that the witness will
give testimony favorable to the party seeking discovery, his
prior statements should be protected despite the existence of
grounds for suspecting inconsistency with his present testi80
mony.
simple narrative statements, or statements produced by a witness himself, are not entitled to work product protection. E.g., Hanson v. Gartland S.S. Co., 34 F.R.D. 493, 497 (N.D. Ohio 1964); Diamond v. Mohawk
Rubber Co., 33 F.R.D. 264, 267-68 (D. Colo. 1963). Professor Moore
criticizes such cases for failing to take account of the fact that the
matters set out in the statement may still reflect skilled questioning
26.23[8.-3], at 1436.
by counsel. 4 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
177. Protecting the statement as such also prevents any need to
identify the individual source of the information provided, but the information must nonetheless be provided. See 4 MOoRE, FEDERAL PRucTic. %26.23[8.-3], at 1435-36.
178. See Part IV infra.
179. See Miller v. Harpster, 392 P.2d 21, 24 (Alas. 1964).
180. The desirability of maintaining secrecy is underscored by the
advice that the existence of inconsistent statements should be concealed
even during preliminary stages of cross-examination, lest a shifty witness explain his way out of the trap. See 3 F. BuscE, LAW Nw
TACTICS IN JURY TRIALs § 400 (1960).
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On the other hand, when it appears by deposition or otherwise that the witness is likely to testify in all matters favorably
to the party possessing the statement, the implications may be
thought less clear. In favor of discovery, it could be urged that
the importance of impeachment in adversary examination at trial
requires production whether or not there is a showing of probable inconsistency. The main argument against discovery would
be that use of such a statement to impeach trial testimony more
favorable to the party who prepared the statement could
artificially taint legitimate testimony. Presumably the statement
was prepared as tactical insurance against an unfavorable change
in testimony, but there are often proper methods of assisting the
witness thereafter to remember events more clearly and favorably. Opportunity to explain any discrepancies at trial might
not provide in practice the theoretically perfect resolution of
enabling the trier to evaluate credibility by weighing the
changes against the explanations, because undue effect might
be accorded to a suspicion that the proponent had improperly
prevailed upon the witness to go one step further than a statement which was purposely drawn as favorably as more spontaneous recollection would permit.
The obvious shortcomings with all of these arguments are
rooted in the shortcomings of surprise impeachment by showing
prior inconsistent statements. The comforting assertion by
many writers that "no honest witness will ever be surprised,"
since "[h] e will testify to what he knows and nothing else,"181
is a transparent simplification which ignores the inevitabilities
of dimming memories, and of discrepancies between statements
prepared at one time by an attorney hoping to benefit his case
and testimony elicited later by an opposing attorney. Even
aside from these overriding difficulties, the simple fact that most
statements reflect the language and thought patterns of the
person preparing them must lead to frequent apparent discrepancies between statement and testimony. Recognition of
these weaknesses of surprise impeachment by prior inconsistent
statements has led to the long-standing proposal that a party
should be able to obtain a copy of a statement which he has
given to the opposing party without further showing of cause,
because of the admissibility of such statements as substantive
evidence under the admissions exception to the hearsay rule and
because the untoward damaging effects of impeaching a party's
181. Hawkins, Discovery and Rule 34: What's So Wrong About
Surprise,39 A.B.A. J. 1075, 1079 (1953).
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own testimony makes it particularly important that inadvertent
inconsistencies be avoided. This argument has been accepted
in the proposed amendments to the Rules, which provide for
production of a party's statement as a matter of course and
82
define "statement" in terms modeled on the Jencks Act.
If such considerations outweigh the strategic importance of
impeachment in the case of statements given by a party, it is
difficult indeed to defend a different rule for statements given
by any other witness. Discovery rules should be developed in
open recognition of the actual trial impact of the material sought
to be discovered-surely the formal limitation of inconsistent
prior statements of a nonparty witness to impeachment use is a
fiction which does not deserve to be enshrined in the discovery
process, however useful it may be otherwise. 183 In this context, the only available distinction between statements of a party
and statements of another witness must be that when a party
is tarred with the brush of inconsistency, the impact is apt to
carry over to his whole case, while similar impeachment of
another witness is apt to cost no more than the testimony of
that witness. Stated more baldly, the proposition is that use of
a party's prior statements against him is apt to result in such
irrational misuse as to outweigh the possible contribution of
surprise to the fact-finding process, while the balance comes out
differently with statements of an ordinary witness.
Categorical demonstration on either side of such a proposition is impossible. It may not be unduly cynical to surmise
that lawyers who believe that they or their clients typically
have superior means of obtaining witness statements will tend
to oppose discovery, while lawyers who believe their opponents
have the advantage in time and resources are apt to favor it.
Historically, similar doubts have been resolved by continually
broadening the scope of discovery, and there is no apparent
182.

PRELvIINARY DRAFT,

Rule 26(b) (3).

The accompanying Note

comments on the most prominent discussions of this problem.
26-27.

Id. at

See a~so Straughan v. Barge MVL No. 802, 291 F. Supp. 282

(S.D. Tex. 1968). The question whether a criminal defendant has a
general right to discovery of his own statements in the hands of the
government under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 (a), or whether
particular need must be shown, is the subject of much current debate.
E.g., United States v. Projansky, 44 F.R.D. 550 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
183. Cogent expressions of doubt about the desirability of the rule
even at trial may be found in C. McCoimvcK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 39
(1954); 3 J. WiGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1018 (3d ed. 1940). See Gelhaar v.
State, - Wis. -, 163 N.W.2d 609 (1969) (allowing substantive use of
some forms of prior inconsistent statements of nonparty witnesses).
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reason to doubt that more good-in terms of better informed
fact-finding-than harm has resulted. 1 84 It seems quite likely
that allowing discovery of all witness statements' 8 5 would lead
to similar results. Admittedly an experiment in this direction
is not likely to be reversible, but past experience with other
expansions of discovery warrants resolution of the doubt in
favor of abrogating the work product doctrine as to witness
statements.
Discovery should be conditioned upon the right of the party
possessing the statement to depose the witness before producing
the statement, in order to capture and preserve the possible
advantages of inconsistency while allowing the witness and
counsel opportunity to consider the inconsistency free of the
burden of trial surprise. Several courts have already adopted
such a protective procedure following a finding that adequate
cause existed to order production of a statement in particular
circumstances. 86 The resulting opportunity for anticipation in
184. Probably the most important cause for concern with the operation of elaborate discovery devices is the extent of the burden which
may be placed on the litigants, and the potential for harassment by
intentional misuse. Production of witness statements clearly involves
no problems on this score. The comparative ease of accomplishing discovery by production of witness statements is indicated by one judge's
observation that until Hickman v. Taylor had suggested that statements
are protected as work product, lawyers practising in his court (the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania)
ordinarily responded to discovery by producing their witness statements
as the total knowledge available to them. Bard, The Practical Operation of FederalDiscovery, 12 F.R.D. 130, 152, 159 (1952).
185. Any effort to thwart discovery by intermingling clearly protectible ruminations of counsel with witness statements could be met
by judicial supervision of the producing party's claim that certain portions should be excised. This procedure was used in Maryland Shipbuilding & Drydock Co. v. Baker-Whitely Towing Co., 42 F.R.D. 12
(D. Md. 1967). Subject to this protection, there is no apparent reason
to condition discovery upon a further showing that the document sought
is a "statement" within the definition now proposed for discovery of a
party's statement. If the document is so far a statement as to be admissible for purposes of impeachment, discovery should be allowed for
the reasons proposed. And if the document is not capable of such use,
it should be protection enough to adopt the rule, suggested earlier, that
production precludes any attempt to elicit impeaching testimony from
the person who prepared it.
186. E.g., Smith v. Central Linen Serv. Co., 39 F.R.D. 15, 18 (D. Md.
1966); McCoy v. General Motors Corp., 33 F.R.D. 354 (W.D. Pa. 1963);
Parla v. Matson Nay. Co., 28 F.R.D. 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). See LaFrance,
Work Product Discovery: A Critique, 68 DicK. L. REv. 351, 369 (1964).
Compare Eastern Fireproofing Co. v. United States Gypsum Co., 21
F.R.D. 290 (D. Mass. 1957) (ordering simultaneous filing with the
court of answers to interrogatories in order to deprive defendant of
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direct examination would greatly diminish the impact of crossexamination based on inconsistent prior statements, but this result may well constitute additional support for such a procedure,
particularly if the rules of evidence are eventually relaxed to
permit open consideration of the prior statement as direct evidence.
Denial of work product protection to witness statements
would eliminate any question regarding protection for the trial
preparation work of non-attorneys in the vast majority of
cases. 187 If protection is continued for nonparty witness statements, however, it has been seen that the only sound reason for
extending such protection is the need to preserve surprise adversary impeachment by prior inconsistency. Since this function
is not affected by the provenance of the statement, the determination of the existence of sufficient cause to justify discovery,
notwithstanding the work product protection, should be made
without regard to the identity of the individual who first procured the statement. 88 Although this conclusion cuts against
both the current decisions favoring discovery of witness statements made in the ordinary course of business and the comments accompanying the proposed Rule amendments, 89 concern
for the identity of the person obtaining the statement can be
justified only on one of the rationalia for work product protection examined above and found wanting.1 90
the advantage of learning the extent of plaintiff's knowledge before
framing its own answers).
This protective device should be distinguished from the provision
found in Rule 26 (f) as originally submitted to the Supreme Court, allowing a party to show at trial prior inconsistent statements made by
a deponent at any time, whether before or after the deposition. Professor Moore speculates that deletion of this provision means that contradictory statements which were known or which reasonably should
have been known at the time a witness is deposed must be used to impeach him at the deposition. Such a rule would go somewhat further
than the proposed protective procedure of prior deposition, since it removes the option whether to confront the witness with his prior statements during the deposition. See 4 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE f 26.35.
187. See text accompanying note 103 supra.
188. Acceptance of this reasoning would also undo the approach
taken in such cases as Steam Tanker Padre Island, Inc. v. London
Assurance, 277 F. Supp. 319 (S.D. Tex. 1967), finding work product
protection inapplicable to witness statements in the hands of plaintiffs'
counsel because they had been obtained by an attorney for a nonparty.
189. The suggestion of the Advisory Committee appears to be that
the identity of the person preparing the material sought to be discovered should be weighed in determining how strong a showing of cause
must be made to justify production. PRELnuNARY DRAFT 24, 26.
190. The theory that discovery will deter adequate trial prepara-
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On the whole, however, it would be better to deny any
special protection against discovery of witness statements other
than the procedural protection afforded by allowing an opportunity to depose the witness before producing his statement.
If accepted, this conclusion would require substantial alteration
of proposed Rule 26(b) (3), which now covers all documents or
tangible things prepared in anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial. Given the rather narrow scope which would
remain for the hard-core work product doctrine, it would probably be best simply to delete the currently proposed revision
and, if it seems desirable, add a general reference to work product protection to the provisions for protective orders in proposed
Rule 26 (c).
IV.

WORK PRODUCT AT PRETRIAL

Emerging pretrial conference practices serve to underscore
some of the discovery developments outlined above. Following
the leads outlined in the Handbook for Effective Pretrial Procedure adopted by the Judicial Conference of the United
States, 191 an increasing number of district courts are routinely
10 2
providing for disclosure of the identity of trial witnesses,
tion has occasionally been discussed in this context. See, e.g., LaFrance, supra note 186, at 376-77 (urging that the notion that discovery
discourages preparation applies equally to work performed by agents
and by attorneys, and is equally fallacious in each instance); Taine,

Discovery of Trial Preparationsin the Federal Courts, 50 COLuM. L.
REv. 1026, 1063 (1950) (suggesting that discovery would deter performance "of important tasks ordinarily attended to by non-attorneys").
Even if the deterrence of preparation theory of protection is accepted,
there is good reason to suppose that the advantages of on-the-spot statements obtained as a matter of ordinary business routine are so great
that the risk of deterrence is insignificant. The resulting conclusion of
free discoverability could be achieved under the proposed rules by
finding that statements prepared in the ordinary course of business are
not prepared in anticipation of litigation; the Notes of the Advisory
Committee seem to suggest this result. PRELImImARY DRAFT 26.
191. 37 F.R.D. 255 (1964).
192. E.g., S.D. CAL. R. 9(f) (9); D. DEL. R. 11 (D) (g); M.D. FLA. R.
10(c) (5); D. IDAHO R. 10(e) (6); N.D. ILL. Notice and Standing Order
Re: Pretrial Conferece in Judge Robinson's Court, 37 F.R.D. 303; N.D.
IND. R. 12(f) (4), (j), (1); D. KAN. R. 15(c) (1); S.D.N.Y. CALENDAR R.
13(b) (1) (III) (h); S.D. Omo R. 10(2); W.D. PA. R. 5 II(C); E.D. TENN.
R. 9(c). (Unless otherwise noted, the local orders and rules cited in
notes 192 to 205 may be found in FED. RULES SERV. LOCAL COURT
RULES.) Excellent discussion may be found in Wirtz v. Hooper-Holmes
Bureau, Inc., 327 F.2d 939 (5th Cir. 1964); Cedolia v. C.S. Hill Saw
fills, Inc., 41 F.R.D. 524 (M.D.N.C. 1967); Taggart v. Vermont Trans.
Co., 32 F.R.D. 587 (E.D. Pa. 1963), affd per curiam, 325 F.2d 1022
(3d Cir. 1964).
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often with a brief summary of the facts or issues as to which
each will testify; 193 for detailed statements of factual contentions
and of facts which may be disposed of by stipulation; 9 4 for
identification of all documents or other items which will be
offered as exhibits at trial; 195 for statements of the legal theories
to be relied upon; 90 and for pre-pretrial meetings by counsel
97
to faclitiate agreement on such matters.
On one level of analysis, such practices merely emphasize
the tacit conclusion of the courts charged with day-to-day administration of the discovery and pretrial rules that such openness results in better operation of the adversary system. This
conclusion reinforces the proposition that work product protection should be limited to a narrow range of areas of obviously
tactical concern.
Pretrial practices of this nature also suggest, however, that
many areas of pretrial disclosure may often be effected most
efficiently by formal conference procedures under the immediate, or at least impending, judicial control. In highly complicated cases, early pretrial proceedings may be useful in establishing the framework within which discovery should operate. 98
In more normal cases, where the pretrial conference usually
193. E.g., E.D. & W.D. ARK. R. 9(f) (1); D. COLO. R. 9(b) (10);

W.D. LA., Instructions to Attorneys in Pre-trial Proceedings (2); D.
NEv. R. 11 (e) (6); E.D.N.C. R. 7 (R); E.D. OKLA. R. 17 (b) (4); W.D. TEx.
R. 26(g) (4). See Mitchell v. Madden, 1 FED. RULES SERV. 2D 33.333,

Case 3 (W.D. La. 1958); J.Wright, The Pretrial Conference, 28 F.R.D.
141, 150 (1960).
194. E.g., D. ALAS. R. 9(F) (6); W.D. Mo. R. 20(7); E.D.N.C. Civ.
R. 7(G) (3); W.D. TEx. R. 26(g) (3). See Industrial Bldg. Materials,
Inc. v. Interchemical Corp., 278 F. Supp. 938 (C.D. Cal. 1967); Castlegate, Inc. v. National Tea Co., 34 F.R.D. 221, 225 (D.Colo. 1963); Harvey
v. Eimco Corp., 33 F.R.D. 360 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
195. E.g., S.D. CAL. R. 9(f) (8); D. CoLo. R. 9(b) (8); D. DEL. R. 11
(c); S.D.N.Y. CALENDAR R. 13 (b) (1) (I1) (g); E.D.N.C. Civ. R. 7(G)
(1); W.D.N.C. R. 7(6); E.D. OKLA. R. 17(b) (2).
196. E.g., C.D. CAL. R. 9(e) (6); N.D. CAL. R. 4(8); D. CONN. R.
10(c); D. DEL. R. 11(D) (e); M.D. FLA. R. 10(E) (2); D. IDAHO R. 10(e)
(4); D. KaN. R. 15(e); D. ME. R. 17(b) (2); D. MONT. R. 11(c) (2), (3);
D. NEv. R. 11 (e) (4): S.D.N.Y. CALENDAR R. 13 (b) (1) (1)(f).
See
Meadow Gold Prods. Co. v. Wright, 278 F.2d 867, 869 (D.C. Cir. 1960):
the pre-trial procedure, when utilized becomes the principle
means of defining the issues in a case and the legal theories upon
which they are to be tried."
197.

E.g., D. ALAS. R. 9(F); E.D. & W.D. ARK. R. 9(f); C.D.

CAL.

R. 9(d); S.D. CAL. R. 9(e); D.D.C., Pretrial Instructions to Counsel I;
D. MD. R. 15 (b).
198. See, e.g., D. MONT. R. 11(c) (5); Handbook of Recommended
Procedures for the Trial of Protracted Cases, 25 F.R.D. 351, 386-90
(1960).
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should be held shortly before trial, it has obvious advantages in
reducing any temptation to rely on the other side or risk of
misuse, and in avoiding premature demands for exposition of
theories and contentions or other trial plans which often remain
fluid during the initial phases of litigation. 199 At the same time,
the requirement of individual discussion between the opposing
attorneys-occurring in many districts as a pre-pretrial conference-and the influence of the judge himself, coming at a
time when the case should be fully developed, may result in a
much clearer definition of positions than could be accomplished
by discovery. 20 0 These conditions make it feasible to implement
the definition of issues and trial plans settled in a pretrial order
with reasonable strictness; yet even in this area the courts have
administered the provisions of Rule 16 allowing modification of
the pretrial order "to prevent manifest injustice" with a degree
of liberality which'should quiet the fears of those who see, in
the corresponding use of discovery, a' return to strict preclusion
20 1
of omitted evidence, witnesses, or theories.
Notwithstanding these advantages, the pretrial conference
should not be offered as a substitute for all discovery of contentions. 20 2 Good faith answers as to. the scope of factual contentions, and even the basic lines of legal contentions, provide
assistance in preparing a case Which might often come too late
if postponed until the time when final lines are being drawn
for trial. The proposed provisions for discretionary control
199. But see, e.g., E.D.N.C. Crv. R. 7(D) (encouraging attorneys to

use discovery "instead of seeking information or admissions at the
conference of attorneys or at the pre-trial conference"); E.D. OKLA. R.
17(b) (6); W.D. TEx. R. 26(d).

200. E.g., United States v. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n,
22 F.R.D. 300, 301-02 (D.D.C. 1958).
201. E.g., Brooks v. Wootten, 355 F.2d 177 (2d Cir. 1966); Globe
Indem. Co. v. Capital Ins. & Sur. Co., 352 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1965);
Coffey v. United States, 333 F.2d 945, 949 (10th Cir. 1964); Clark v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 328 F.2d 591 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1006
(1964). When modification of the pretrial order is denied, the justification is often advanced that it is necessary to prevent callous disregard for pretrial procedures if they are to be effective. E.g., Trask v.
Susskind, 376 F.2d 17 (5th Cir. 1967); Thompson v. Calmar S.S. Corp.,
331 F.2d 657, 662 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 913 (1964); Payne v.
S.S. Nabob, 302 F.2d 803, 807 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 870
(1962).
202. One practical limitation is that pretrial procedures are not
used in all cases. The Columbia Survey, for instance, found that

"Pretrial conferences were held in slightly less than one half the cases
of the types sampled for this study." CoLuivmA REPORT I. 32. Compare D. ORE. R. 36(b)

(provides for pretrial exchange of exhibits in

cases in which no pretrial conference is held).
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20 3
over the time for answering discovery requests of this nature
are well suited to the avoidance of any rigid timing requirements and provide the only necessary limitations.
One notable feature stands out from many of the broader
pretrial procedures. Exception is often made from the requirements of listing witnesses and producing trial exhibits for rebuttal 20 4 or impeachment materials.205 As examined above, this
exception is often supplemented by a requirement that a party
seeking to withhold material for impeachment use must submit
it to the court for a determination whether it is indeed impeaching in character.200 So long as impeaching material is protected from discovery in order to preserve the additional effect
resulting from surprise, there is little logical reason to allow
pretrial procedures to destroy the surprise. If discovery should
become available along the lines suggested above, however, pretrial practice should be changed accordingly.

V. WORK PRODUCT IN CONCLUSION
The case for embodying a specific work product provision
in the Federal Rules seems clear enough. Decisional development of the several closely related concepts grouped around
this doctrine has spawned what one court calls a "huge jungle of
conflicting decisions,'

20 7

and another judge has labeled a "curi-

203. PRELnMiNARY DRAT Rules 33 (b), 36 (a).
204. E.g., E.D. & W.D. Ark. R. 9(f) (1); D.D.C., Pretrial Instructions
to Counsel II B, D; N.D. Ind. Pre-Trial Order J(3); S.D. Ind. Notice of
Pretrial Conference, 37 F.R.D. 311; N.D. Tex. Notice for Pretrial Order,
37 F.R.D. 300; D. Utah Pretrial Order, 37 F.R.D. 313. See also, e.g.,
M.D.N.C. R. 22(j) (6) (ii) (permitting witnesses not listed in pretrial
proceedings to be called when "it becomes necessary to impeach or
rebut the testimony of a listed witness, or to meet unexpected developments of the trial").
205. E.g., D. ALAS. R. 9(G), R. 9-A; C.D. CAL. R. 9(d), 9(e) (8);
N.D. CAL. R. 4(10), (11); S.D. CAL R. 9(e), (f)(8), (9); D. InAHo R.
10(d), (e) (5); S.D. IowA R. 9(C) (b); W.D. La. Instructions to Attorneys in Pre-Trial Proceedings (5); W.D. PA. R. 5 II(G); E.D. WASH. R.
9(e). Many local rules provide an exception for impeaching exhibits,
but are silent as to impeaching witnesses. E.g., D. NEv. R. 11(d),
11(e) (5), (6); W.D. Tm. R. 26(g)(1), (4); W.D. WASH. R. 26(3), (f)
(advance disclosure required for all but rebuttal witnesses, all but impeaching documents). D. MoNT. R. 11(e) (2) (v), provides that exhibits
to be used for impeachment purposes only may be placed in a sealed
envelope, to be opened only on order of the court. Presumably such
distinctions are based on an intentional effort to protect witness statements from revelation even at the pretrial conference.
206. See text accompanying note 155 supra.
207. Monier v. Chamberlain, 35 Ill. 2d 351, 361, 221 N.E.2d 410, 417
(1966).
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ous congeries of judicial confusion. '208 The rulemaking process
is in part designed to help remove precisely this kind of problem
as developing experience reveals its nature and dimensions. 2 9
Although a self-applying rule is unattainable, more than two
decades have provided hundreds of reported decisions and scholastic commentary by the ream to illuminate the problem and
prepare the way for at least a suggestive restatement.
On first acquaintance, the case on the other side is neither
so clear nor so convincing.210 The only substantial fear may
seem to be that adoption of a rule will preclude reasoned caseby-case balancing of the need for adequate discovery against
the need to preserve whatever values inhere in affording some
protection to trial preparation,21 1 and this worry is adequately
answered by the flexibility built into the provision allowing discovery upon a showing of good cause.
Examination of the claims which have been made for the
work product doctrine, and of the actual development of discovery practices which are seldom directly related to it, suggests a more profound concern. Adoption of an express provision addressed only to production of documents or tangible
things may serve to distort the legitimate scope of the doctrine
and lend it an aura of legitimacy which it does not deserve.
This danger may be largely avoided if courts give full effect to
the comment in the notes of the Advisory Committee that factual
information shall remain freely discoverable, and to the express
provisions elsewhere in the proposed Rules for discovery of
legal theories and contentions. If so, the proposed protection
208. Wilson v. Borchard, 370 Mich. 404, 413, 122 N.W.2d 57, 61
(1963) (Black, J., concurring).
209. See Wright, Amendments to the Federal Rules: The Function
of a Continuing Rules Committee, 7 VAND. L. REv. 521, 531 (1954).
210. The Notes of the Advisory Committee to the proposed work
product provisions of Rule 26(b) (3) state that consideration was given
not only to the suggestion that work product protection should be abolished entirely, but also to the suggestion that in any event written
statements of witnesses should be freely discoverable. No explanation
is offered for rejection of these suggestions beyond the one sentence
statement of the general rationale for work product protection as
viewed by the Committee. PRELiMINARY DRAFT 24-25.

211. See, e.g., Pruitt, Lawyer's Work Product, 37

STATS

BAR

OF

CALIF. J. 228, 236-38 (1962). Compare Professor Cleary's comment that
in Hickman v. Taylor,
the Court was once more trapped by an apparently felt necessity of saving face by refusing to admit that a contingency had
arisen which the rules had not foreseen or had dealt with
improvidently.
Clearly, Hickman v. Jencks: Jurisprudence of the Adversary System,
14 VAN. L. REv. 865, 866 (1961).
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against production of "documents and tangible things prepared
in anticipation of litigation or for trial" may well be limited in
application to the loosely defined area of "hard-core work product"-which will of course be protected against other methods
of discovery as well under an implicit continuation of present
practices-and impeaching material, particularly witness statements.
If this is the scope of the protection which is to be given
under the proposed Rules-as it should be-the most important
remaining question is whether witness statements should be
given such protection. Acceptance of the proposal that such protection should not be afforded to witness statements would
make it impossible to define the area of work product protection
in terms of writings or tangible things prepared in anticipation
of litigation. Since the remaining hard-core concept of work
product protection involves all forms of discovery, it could be
incorporated under the general protective provisions, similar to
present Rule 30(b), in proposed Rule 26(c). Given the difficulty
of defining the narrow area of appropriate restriction, it would
probably be wiser to limit any such provision to a bare reference
to protection against discovery of "work product."
Alternatively, the doctrine could profitably be left to its present
foundations in decisional law. In either case, it would be wise
to include in the official comments an observation that work
product protection should be accorded only to those parts of the
mental impressions and theories of an attorney or other participant in the litigative process which must remain secret for the
efficient working of the adversary system. Likewise, it should
be noted that the new provisions for production of documents
without need for judicial order or showing of good cause extend to production of witness statements.

